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Abstract. We explore the relationships between Description Logics and Set The-
ory. The study is carried on using, on the set-theoretic side, a very rudimentary ax-
iomatic set theory Ω, consisting of only four axioms characterizing binary union,
set difference, inclusion, and the power-set. An extension ofALC,ALCΩ , is then
defined in which concepts are naturally interpreted as sets living in Ω-models.
In ALCΩ not only membership between concepts is allowed—even admitting
circularity—but also the power-set construct is exploited to add metamodeling
capabilities. We investigate translations of ALCΩ into standard description log-
ics as well as a set-theoretic translation. A polynomial encoding of ALCΩ in
ALCOI proves the validity of the finite model property as well as an EXP-
TIME upper bound on the complexity of concept satisfiability. We develop a set-
theoretic translation of ALCΩ in the theory Ω, exploiting a technique proposed
for translating normal modal and polymodal logics into Ω. Finally, we show that
the fragment LCΩ of ALCΩ , which does not admit roles and individual names,
is as expressive as ALCΩ
1 Introduction
Concept and concept constructors in Description Logics (DLs) allow to manage infor-
mation built-up and stored as collections of elements of a given domain. In this paper
we would like to take the above statement “seriously” and put forward a DL doubly
linked with a (very simple, axiomatic) set theory. Such a logic will be suitable to ma-
nipulate concepts (also called classes in OWL [29]) as first-class citizens, in the sense
that it will allow the possibility to have concepts as instances (a.k.a. elements) of other
concepts. From the set-theoretic point of view this is the way to proceed, as stated in
the following quotation from the celebrated Naive Set Theory ([17]):
Sets, as they are usually conceived, have elements or members. An element of a
set may be a wolf, a grape, or a pidgeon. It is important to know that a set itself
may also be an element of some other set. [...] What may be surprising is not
so much that sets may occur as elements, but that for mathematical purposes
no other elements need ever be considered.
P. HALMOS
Also in the Description Logic arena the idea of enhancing the language of descrip-
tion logics with statements of the form C ∈ D, with C and D concepts, is not new, as
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assertions of the formD(A), with A a concept name, are already allowed in OWL-Full
[29]. Here, we do not consider roles, i.e. relations among individuals (also called prop-
erties in OWL), as possible instances of concepts. However, we would like to push the
usage of membership among concepts a little forward, allowing not only the possibility
of stating that an arbitrary concept C can be thought of as an instance of another one
(C ∈ D)—or even as an instance of itself (C ∈ C)—but also opening to the possibil-
ity of talking about all possible sub-concepts of C, that is adding memberships to the
power-set Pow(C) of C.
In order to realize our plan we introduce a DL, to be dubbed ALCΩ , whose two
parents are ALC and a rudimentary (finitely axiomatized) set theory Ω.
Considering an example taken from [31,25], using membership axioms, we can
represent the fact that eagles are in the red list of endangered species by the axiom
Eagle ∈ RedListSpecies and that Harry is an eagle, by the assertion Eagle(harry). We
could further consider a concept ModifiableList , consisting of those lists that can be
modified and, for example, it would be reasonable to ask RedListSpecies ∈ Modifiable
List but, more interestingly, we would also clearly wantModifiableList ∈ ModifiableList .
The power-set concept, Pow(C), allows to capture in a natural way the interac-
tions between concepts and metaconcepts. Considering again the example above, the
statement “all instances of species in the red list are not allowed to be hunted”, can
be represented by the concept inclusion axiom:RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(CannotHunt),
meaning that all the instances in theRedListSpecies (as the class Eagle) are collections
of individuals of the class CannotHunt . Notice, however, that Pow(CannotHunt) is
not limited to include RedListSpecies but can include a much larger universe of sets
(e.g. anything belonging to Pow(Humans)).
Motik has shown in [25] that the semantics of metamodeling adopted in OWL-Full
leads to undecidability already for ALC-Full, due to the free mixing of logical and
metalogical symbols. In [25], limiting this free mixing but allowing atomic names to
be interpreted as concepts and to occur as instances of other concepts, two alternative
semantics (the Contextual pi-semantics and the Hilog ν-semantics) are proposed for
metamodeling. Decidability of SHOIQ extended with metamodeling is proved under
either one of the two proposed semantics. Many other approaches to metamodeling
have been proposed in the literature, including membership among concepts. Most of
them [3,11,19,22,16] are based on a Hilog semantics, while [28,26] define extensions
of OWL DL and of SHIQ (respectively), based on semantics interpreting concepts
as well-founded sets—i.e. sets with no cycles or infinite descending chains of ∈-related
sets. None of these proposals includes the power-set concept constructor in the language
apart from [3], where a way of representing the power-set in description logics was
suggested.
Here, we propose an extension ofALC with power-set concepts andmembership ax-
ioms among concepts, whose semantics is naturally defined using sets (not necessarily
well-founded) living in Ω-models. We first prove that ALCΩ is decidable by defining,
for anyALCΩ knowledge baseK , a polynomial translationKT into ALCOI , exploit-
ing a technique—originally proposed and studied in [10] for defining a set-theoretic
translation of normal modal logics —consisting in identifying the membership relation
∈ with the accessibility relation of a normal modality. Such an identification naturally
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leads to a correspondence between the power-set operator and the modal necessity op-
erator ✷, a correspondence used here to translate power-set concepts into ∀R.C-type
concepts. We show that the translationKT enjoys the finite model property and exploit
it in the proof of completeness of the translation. From the translation in ALCOI we
also get an EXPTIME upper bound on the complexity of concept satisfiability inALCΩ .
Interestingly enough, our translation has strong relations with the first-order reductions
in [15,19,22].
We further exploit the correspondence between ∈ and the accessibility relation of
a normal modality in another direction (the direction considered in [10]), to provide
a polynomial set-theoretic translation of ALCΩ in the set theory Ω. Our aim is to un-
derstand the real nature of the power-set concept in ALCΩ , as well as showing that a
description logic with just the power-set concept, but no roles and no individual names,
is as expressive as ALCΩ .
We proceed step by step by first defining a set-theoretic translation of ALC with
empty ABox (in Section 5.1), directly exploiting Schild’s correspondence result [30]
and the set-theoretic translation for normal polymodal logics in [10]. Then, we extend
the translation to ALCΩ , first considering (in Section 5.2) the fragment of ALCΩ con-
taining union, intersection, (set-)difference, complement, and power-set (but neither
roles nor named individuals) and we show that this fragment, that we call LCΩ , has
an immediate set-theoretic translation intoΩ, where the power-set concept is translated
to the power-set in Ω. Finally, (in Section 5.3) we provide an encoding of the whole
ALCΩ into LCΩ . This encoding shows that LCΩ is as expressive as ALCΩ and also
provides, as a by-product, a set-theoretic translation of ALCΩ where the membership
relation ∈ is used to capture both the roles Ri and the membership relation in ALC
Ω .
The full path leads to a set-theoretic translation of both the universal restriction and
power-set concept of ALCΩ in the theory Ω using the single relational symbol ∈.
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 recalls the definition of the
description logicsALC and ALCOI , and of the set theory Ω. Section 3 introduces the
logic ALCΩ . Section 4 provides a translation of the logic ALCΩ into the description
logic ALCOI . Section 5 develops set-theoretic translations for ALC and LCΩ and an
encoding of ALCΩ into LCΩ . Section 6 contains some discussion, Section 7 describes
related work and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The description logicsALC andALCOI
Let NC be a set of concept names, NR a set of role names and NI a set of individual
names. The set C of ALC concepts can be defined inductively as follows:
- A ∈ NC , ⊤ and ⊥ are concepts in C;
- if C,D ∈ C and R ∈ NR, then C ⊓D,C ⊔D,¬C, ∀R.C, ∃R.C are concepts in
C.
A knowledge base (KB)K is a pair (T ,A), where T is a TBox andA an ABox. T is a
set of concept inclusions (or subsumptions) C ⊑ D, where C,D are concepts in C. A
is a set of assertions of the form C(a) and R(a, b) where C is a concept, R ∈ NR, and
a, b ∈ NI .
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An interpretation for ALC (see [2]) is a pair I = 〈∆, ·I〉 where: ∆ is a domain—
a set whose elements are denoted by x, y, z, . . .—and ·I is an extension function that
maps each concept name C ∈ NC to a set C
I ⊆ ∆, each role name R ∈ NR to a
binary relation RI ⊆ ∆×∆, and each individual name a ∈ NI to an element aI ∈ ∆.
It is extended to complex concepts as follows: ⊤I = ∆, ⊥I = ∅, (¬C)I = ∆\CI ,
(C ⊓D)I = CI ∩DI , (C ⊔D)I = CI ∪DI , and
(∀R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∀y.(x, y) ∈ RI → y ∈ CI}
(∃R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∃y.(x, y) ∈ RI & y ∈ CI}.
The notion of satisfiability of a KB in an interpretation is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Satisfiability and entailment).Given anALC interpretation I = 〈∆, ·I〉:
- I satisfies an inclusion C ⊑ D if CI ⊆ DI ;
- I satisfies an assertion C(a) if aI ∈ CI and an assertion R(a, b) if (aI , bI) ∈ RI .
Given a KB K = (T ,A), an interpretation I satisfies T (resp. A) if I satisfies all
inclusions in T (resp. all assertions in A); I is a model ofK if I satisfies T andA.
Let a query F be either an inclusion C ⊑ D (where C and D are concepts) or an
assertion C(a): F is entailed byK , written K |= F , if for all models I =〈∆, ·I〉 ofK ,
I satisfies F .
Given a knowledge baseK , the subsumption problem is the problemof decidingwhether
a given inclusion C ⊑ D is entailed by K . The instance checking problem is the prob-
lem of deciding whether a given assertion C(a) is entailed by K . The concept satisfia-
bility problem w.r.t. a knowledge baseK is the problem of deciding, for a given concept
C, whether C is consistent withK (i.e., whether there exists a model I ofK , such that
CI 6= ∅).
In the following we will also consider the description logic ALCOI allowing in-
verse roles and nominals. For a role R ∈ NR, its inverse is a role, denoted by R−,
which can be used in existential and universal restrictions with the following semantics:
(x, y) ∈ (R−)I if and only if (y, x) ∈ RI . For a named individual a ∈ NI , the nominal
{a} is the concept such that: ({a})I = {aI}.
2.2 The theoryΩ
The first-order axiomatic set theory Ω at the ground of our translation, consists of four
extremely simple axioms (partially) characterizing the binary constructors union and
set-difference, as well as the power-set constructor. The underlying language is reduced
to the relation symbols denoting membership and inclusion. More formally:
Definition 2. Consider a first order language with two binary relational symbols de-
noted by ∈ and ⊆, (to be used in infix notation). Let ∪ and \ two binary functional
symbols (also used in the customary infix notation) and let Pow be a unary function
symbol.
The axiomatic set theory Ω consists of the following collection of four axioms:
1. x ∈ y ∪ z ↔ x ∈ y ∨ x ∈ z;
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2. x ∈ y\z ↔ x ∈ y ∧ x 6∈ z;
3. x ⊆ y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x→ z ∈ y);
4. x ∈ Pow (y)↔ x ⊆ y,
completed with the standard deduction rules of generalization and modus-ponens.
The above theory must be intended as a minimal Hilbert-style axiomatic system for
set theory. When thinking of specific models of Ω, however, we can clearly think of
structures satisfying extra axioms. In particular, for example, the familiar well-founded
models of set theories, are perfectly legitimate models ofΩ, in which the extra axiom of
well-foundedness—implying that ∈ cannot form cycles or infinite descending chains—
holds. For instance let x = {∅, {∅}}. x is a finite well-founded set, and the sets ∅ and
{∅} are elements of x. Instead, the set y = {∅, {∅, {∅, {. . .}}} is finite but not well-
founded.
Whatever the axioms satisfied by the Ω-model under consideration are, however,
everything in the domain of such a model is supposed to be a set. As a consequence, a
set will have (only) sets as its elements. Moreover, as observed, circular definitions of
sets are not forbidden. That is, for example, there are models of Ω in which there are
sets admitting themselves as elements. For instance, the set y above could simply be
defined as y = {∅, y} and has elements ∅ and y itself.
Finally, not postulating in Ω any explicit “axiomatic link” between membership ∈
and equality—more precisely: having no extensionality axiom—, there exist Ω-models
in which there are different sets with equal collection of elements. One (elementary)
consequence of the extensionality axiom is the familiar fact that if a ⊆ b and b ⊆ a,
then a = b. In non-extensional models, instead, there can be pairwise distinct sets
included in each other. The set x′ = {a, b, {b, c}} with a, b and c pairwise distinct and
such that a, b, c ⊆ ∅, does not satisfy extensionality as a, b and c are different sets with
the same (empty) extension.
Definition 3. Ω-models are first order interpretations M = (U , ·M) satisfying the
axioms of the theoryΩ. The universe U is the domain of interpretation ofM and, ·M is
an interpretation function mapping each symbolPow ,∪, \ of the language to a function
over U (that is, PowM : U → U , ∪M : U × U → U and \M : U × U → U) and each
predicate symbol ∈ and ⊆ to a binary relation over U (that is, ∈M and ⊆M).
Below, for sake of readability, we will avoid superscripts in ∈M, ⊆M, PowM, ∪M,
\M.
Observe that the universe U of any Ω-modelM must be infinite, as any element in
U must have its power-set in U and, as an elementary consequence of Cantor’s Theorem
(see [21]), |Pow(x)| > |x| when |x| is finite. This closure with respect to the use of the
power-set operator produces the most natural Ω-model, a well-founded one in which
extensionality holds—and hence different sets are, in fact, extensionally different.
Definition 4. The hereditarily finite well-founded sets HF denote the Ω-model M =
(U , ·M) such that
- U is HF =
⋃
n∈N HFn, where HF0 = ∅; and HFn+1 = Pow(HFn), for all i ∈ N;
- ·M it the natural interpretations of ∈, ⊆, Pow , ∪ and \ in HF.
6 Laura Giordano and Alberto Policriti
By the above observationHF is minimal among the well-founded models of Ω in that
it can be embedded in any model of Ω. In HF (sometimes denoted also as HF0) every
system of set-theoretic equations of the form:


x1 = {x1,1, . . . , x1,m1};
x2 = {x2,1, . . . , x2,m2};
...
...
xn = {xn,1, . . . , xn,mn},
where n is finite, and xi,j is one among x1, . . . , xi−1 for i = 1, . . . , n and j =
1, . . . ,mi, finds a unique solution. Hence, HF can be even identified with the collec-
tion of such systems of equations which, taken individually, are actually in bijective
correspondence with the adjacency matrices of finite graphs.
Insisting that xi,j must be one of the left-hand side of equations defining an xk with
k < i, guarantees that a solution can be found in an ordered manner. In fact, it can
be easily proved (even by an elementary graph-theoretic argument), that whenever a
solution exists, every xi can be found in HFi+1. As an example, the set x = {∅, {∅}}
above is in HF0, and can be defined by the system of equations: x1 = {x2, x3};x2 =
{x3};x3 = {}.
If we drop the above mentioned index-ordering restriction (thereby allowing, for in-
stance, such an equation as x = {x}), in order to guarantee the existence of solutions in
the model we need to work with universes richer than HF. The most natural (and min-
imal) among such universes is a close relative of HF0, goes under the name of HF1/2,
the universe of (rational) hypersets (see [1,27]), and can be defined as the extension of
HF obtained postulating unique solution to all finite systems of equations of the above
form—no constraint on the indexes of the xi,j ’s, that now can be one among x1, . . . , xn.
An example of hypersets in HF1/2 is the set y = {∅, {∅, {∅, {. . .}}} above, obtained as
the solution of the system of equations {y = {∅, y}}.
The universe HF1/2 of rational hypersets is the one we will mostly use. The ele-
ments in HF
1/2
are called rational in analogy to rational numbers, and HF
1/2
can be
further extended (to HF1), admitting even hypersets characterised by infinite systems
of set-theoretic equations (with a unique solution) only.
A complete discussion relative to universes of sets that can be used as models of
Ω goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is convenient to point out that, in
all cases of interest for us here, an especially simple view of Ω-models can be given
using finite graphs. Actually, HF0 or HF1/2 can be identified as the collection of finite
graphs—either acyclic or cyclic, respectively—, where sets are nodes and arcs depict
the membership relation among sets (see [27]). Given one such membership graph G,
its nodes represent a (hyper)set s together with the elements of the transitive closure of
s (i.e. the elements of s, the elements of the elements of s, the elements of the elements
of the elements s, ... . See Definition 6).
More precisely, an hereditarily finite set can be uniquely represented by a finite,
acyclic, oriented and extensional (different nodes have different collections of succes-
sors) graph, with the edge relation h → h′ standing for h ∋ h′. Any such graph as a
single source, called the point of the graph, and a single sink, that is the empty set ∅.
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This gives us the alternative—more graph-theoretic—view of the model HF0, whose
domain is now the collection of finite, well-founded, oriented and extensional graphs.
A formal definition of HF
1/2
can be given using the above outlined graph-theoretic
rendering of HF0: simply drop acyclicity and replace extensionality with the require-
ment that no two nodes of the graph are bisimilar (see [27] for the definition of bisim-
ilarity relation and recall that HF0 ⊂ HF1/2). We keep also the requirement that a
point—i.e. a node from which every other node is reachable—of the graph is provided.
Definition 5. The hereditarily finite hypersetsHF1/2 denote theΩ-modelM = (U , ·M)
such that
- U is the collection of pointed, finite, oriented graphs whose only bisimulation
relation is the identity;
- ·M is defined for ∈ as follows: h′ ∈M h holds when h′ is the sub-graph whose
point is one of the successor of the point of h. The remaining operators are interpreted
following their definition.
A final further enrichment of both HF0 and HF1/2 is obtained by adding atoms
(sometimes called urelements) to their domain universes. Atoms can be thought as pair-
wise distinct copies of the empty set, are going to be denoted by a1, a2, . . ., and col-
lectively represented by A = {a1, a2, . . .}. The resulting universes will be denoted by
HF
0(A) and HF1/2(A). When considering a modelM of Ω over the atoms in A, we
mean that A ⊆ U .
While HF 0, HF1/2 and HF1 only contain finite sets, other models of Ω may also
admit infinite sets, such as the infinite set of natural numbers.
In the next section, we will regard the domain ∆ of a DL interpretation as a (finite
or infinite) transitive set in a universe of an Ω-model, i.e. ∆ will be a set of sets in (a
universe of a model of) the theoryΩ rather than as a set of individuals, as customary in
description logics.
Definition 6. A element x in an Ω-model is said to be a transitive set if it satisfies the
formula: (∀y ∈ x)(y ⊆ x).
For example, the set x = {a, b, c, {a, b}} over A (with A = {a, b, c, . . .}) is transitive,
while the set x′ = {a, c, {a, b}} is not transitive, as {a, b} ∈ x′ but {a, b} 6⊆ x′.
Both x and x′ are well-founded sets, instead the set of equations: {y = {a, b, x}, x =
{b, y}} defines a collection of hypersets represented by the graph in Figure 1, including
the hyperset y = {a, b, {b, y}}, which is neither well-founded nor transitive (y is an
hyperset in HF1/2(A)).
3 The description logicALCΩ
We start from the observation that inALC concepts are interpreted as sets (namely, sets
of domain elements) and we generalize ALC by allowing concepts to be interpreted as
sets living in a model of the set theory Ω. In addition, we extend the language of ALC
by introducing the power-set as a new concept constructor, and allowing membership
relations among concepts in the knowledge base. We callALCΩ the resulting extension
of ALC.
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y
a
b
x
Fig. 1. Example of a hyperset y, built from atoms a and b, which is neither well-founded
nor transitive: x is an element of y but is not included in y, since y (that belongs to the
transitive closure of y) is not among the elements of y.
As before, let NI , NC , and NR be the set of individual names, concept names,
and role names in the language, respectively. In building complex concepts, in addition
to the constructs of ALC , we also consider the difference \ and the power-set Pow
constructs.
Definition 7. The set of ALCΩ concepts are defined inductively as follows:
- A ∈ NC , ⊤ and ⊥ are ALC
Ω concepts;
- if C,D areALCΩ concepts andR ∈ NR, then the following areALC
Ω concepts:
C ⊓D,C ⊔D,¬C,C\D,Pow(C), ∀R.C, ∃R.C
While the conceptC\D can be easily defined asC⊓¬D inALC, this is not the case for
the concept Pow(C). Informally, the instances of concept Pow(C) are all the subsets of
the instances of concept C, which are “visible” in (i.e. which belong to)∆.
Besides usual assertions of the forms C(a) and R(a, b) with a, b ∈ NI , ALC
Ω
allows in the ABox concept membership axioms and role membership axioms of the
forms C ∈ D and (C,D) ∈ R, respectively, where C and D are ALCΩ concepts and
R is a role name.
Considering again the example in Section 1, the additional expressivity of the lan-
guage, in which general concepts (and not only concept names) can be instances of other
concepts, allows for instance to represent the statement that bears which are polar are in
the red list of endangered species, by axiom PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ∈ RedListSpecies .
We can further represent the fact the polar bears are more endangered than eagles
by adding a role moreEndangered and the role membership axiom (PolarCreature⊓
Bear ,Eagle) ∈ moreEndangered . The inclusionRedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(CannotHunt)
means that any element of RedListSpecies (such as Eagle) is a subset of CannotHunt ,
i.e., each single eagle cannot be hunted. As shown in [25], the meaning of the sentence
“all the instances of species in the Red List are not allowed to be hunted” could be cap-
tured by combining the ν-semantics with SWRL [20], but not by the ν-semantics alone.
We define a semantics forALCΩ by extending theALC semantics in Section 2.1 to
capture the meaning of concepts (including concept Pow(C)) as elements (sets) of the
domain ∆, chosen to be a transitive set (i.e. a set x such that x’s elements are also x’s
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subsets, see Definition 6). Roles are interpreted as binary relations over the domain∆,
concepts as subsets of ∆, and individual names as elements of a set of atoms A—from
which the sets in ∆ are built.
Definition 8. An interpretation for ALCΩ is a pair I = 〈∆, ·I〉 over a set of atoms A
where:
– the non-empty domain∆ is a transitive set chosen in the universe U of a modelM
of Ω over the atoms in A;
– the extension function ·I maps each concept name A ∈ NC to a subset AI ⊆ ∆,1
each role name R ∈ NR to a binary relation RI ⊆ ∆ × ∆, and each individual
name a ∈ NI to an element aI ∈ A ∩∆.
The function ·I is extended to complex concepts ofALCΩ , as in Section 2.1 forALC, but
for the two additional cases: (Pow(C))I = Pow(CI) ∩∆ and (C\D)I = (CI\DI).
Observe that A ∩∆ consists of the atoms in A necessary for the interpretation of indi-
vidual names. Moreover, even though U is closed under union, power-set, etc., the set
∆ is not guaranteed to be so. In particular, the interpretation CI of a concept C is not
necessarily an element of ∆. However, given the interpretation above of the power-set
concept as the portion of the (set-theoretic) power-set visible in ∆, it easy to see by
induction that, for each C, the extension of CI is a subset of∆ (i.e., CI ⊆ ∆).
The requirement that the set ∆ is transitive is needed to guarantee that, when we
consider any set x in ∆, all the instances of x are elements of ∆ as well. For example,
if EagleI is an element of∆, then any specific element (any eagle) in EagleI must be
an element of∆.
As we will see later, the choice of ∆ being equal to the universe U (rather than
being a transitive set in U) is not viable when one wants to include in the language a
concept⊤, as usual in description logics. Indeed, the universe U is not, in general, a set,
while the interpretation of ⊤ must be a set (and all set theoretic operations, including
the power-set, can be applied to it).
While U is always infinite, ∆ is not necessarily an infinite set. Also, the interpreta-
tion of Pow(⊤) is not always the same as that of ⊤. Consider the following example
with∆ a finite transitive set:
∆ = {a, b, c, {a, b}, {a, c}}.
By definition, ⊤I = ∆ and Pow(⊤)I = Pow(∆) ∩ ∆ = {{a, b}, {a, c}}. Hence, in
this example, Pow(⊤)I 6= ⊤I and, furthermore,⊤I 6∈ ∆ .
As a further observation, since extensionality does not hold in ALCΩ (as it does
not hold in Ω) two concepts Eagle and Aquila with the same extension may be inter-
preted as different sets in the models of the knowledge base (i.e., EagleI 6= AquilaI),
although they have the same elements. As a consequence, for instance, from EagleI ∈
RedListSpeciesI, one cannot conclude AquilaI ∈ RedListSpeciesI.
1 Observe that condition AI ⊆ ∆ is the usual one for concept names in ALC semantics, and
it is weaker than the semantic condition AI ∈ ∆ required in [13] and in [14]. This allows a
more uniform treatment of all concepts and slightly simplifies the set-theoretic translations.
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Given an interpretation I , the satisfiability of inclusions and assertions is defined as
in ALC interpretations (Definition 1). Satisfiability of (concept and role) membership
axioms in an interpretation I is defined as follows: I satisfies C ∈ D if CI ∈ DI ; I
satisfies (C,D) ∈ R if (CI , DI) ∈ RI . With this addition, the notions of satisfiability
of a KB and of entailment in ALCΩ (denoted |=ALCΩ ) can be defined as in Section 2.1.
The problem of instance checking inALCΩ includes both the problem of verifying
whether an assertion C(a) is a logical consequence of the KB and the problem of veri-
fying whether a membership C ∈ D is a logical consequence of the KB (i.e., whether
C is an instance ofD).
Example 1. LetK = (T ,A) be a knowledge base, where T is the set of inclusions:
(1) ReadingGroup ⊑ Pow(Person)
(2)Meeting ⊑ Pow(ReadingGroup)
(3)Meeting ⊑ Pow(∃has leader .Person)
(4) SummerMeeting ⊑ Pow(∃has paid .Fee)
and A contains the assertions (for conciseness, we write A,B ∈ C for A ∈ C and
B ∈ C):
HistoryGroup,FantasyGroup, ScienceGroup ∈ ReadingGroup;
SummerMeeting,WinterMeeting ∈ Meeting;
ScienceGroup,FantasyGroup ∈ SummerMeeting;
bob ∈ FantasyGroup; alice, bob ∈ ScienceGroup; carl ∈ HistoryGroup.
Each reading group is a set of persons (1) and, in particular, the history, fantasy and
science groups are reading groups. Bob is in the Fantasy group Carl is in the History
group, while Alice and Bob are in the Science group. Each meeting is a set of reading
groups (2). In particular, the SummerMeeting and the WinterMeeting are meetings.
Both the Science group and the Fantasy group participate to the SummerMeeting . Each
reading group in a meeting has a leader, who is a person (3). All participants to the
SummerMeeting have paid the registration fee (4).
From this specification, we can conclude that both the science and the fantasy
groups have some leader who is a person, and that Alice and Bob participate to the sum-
mer meeting and have paid the registration fee. For instance, as SummerMeeting ∈
Meeting , by inclusion (3), SummerMeeting ∈ Pow(∃has leader .Person), i.e., Sum-
merMeeting ⊑ ∃has leader .Person . Now, as ScienceGroup ∈ SummerMeeting,
then ScienceGroup ∈ ∃has leader .Person , andwe can conclude that the Science group
has a leader who is a person.
To see that Bob has paid the registration fee, consider that bob ∈ ScienceGroup. As
Science- Group ∈ SummerMeeting , by (4), ScienceGroup ∈ Pow(∃has paid .Fee).
Then, ScienceGroup ⊑ ∃has paid .Fee and, therefore, bob ∈ ∃has paid .Fee . Notice
that, instead of axiom (4), we could have introduced the inclusion axiom Meeting ⊑
(Pow(Pow(∃has paid .Fee)) meaning that, for any meeting, all participants have paid
the registration fee.
In the next section, we define a polynomial encoding of the language ALCΩ into
ALCOI .
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4 Translation ofALCΩ into ALCOI
To provide a proof method for ALCΩ , we define a translation of ALCΩ into the de-
scription logic ALCOI , including inverse roles and nominals. In [10] the membership
relation ∈ is used to represent the accessibility relation R of a normal modal logic. In
this section, vice-versa, we exploit the correspondence between ∈ and the accessibility
relation of a modality, by introducing a new (reserved) role e in NR to represent the
inverse of the membership relation: in any interpretation I , (x, y) ∈ eI will stand for
y ∈ x. The idea underlying the translation is that each element u of the domain∆ in an
ALCOI interpretation I = 〈∆, ·I〉 can be regarded as the set of all the elements v such
that (u, v) ∈ eI .
The translation of a knowledge base K = (T ,A) of ALCΩ into ALCOI can be
defined as follows. First, we associate each concept C of ALCΩ to a concept CT of
ALCOI by replacing all occurrences of the power-set constructor Pow with a concept
involving the universal restriction ∀e (see below). More formally, we inductively define
the translation CT of C by simply recursively replacing every subconcept Pow(D)
appearing in C by ∀e.DT , while the translation T commutes with concept constructors
in all other cases (and BT = B, for any concept name B).
Semantically this will result in interpreting any (sub)concept (Pow(D))I by
(∀e.D)I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∀y((x, y) ∈ eI → y ∈ DI)},
which, recalling that (x, y) ∈ eI stands for y ∈ x, characterises the collection of subsets
ofDI visible in∆ (i.e. subsets ofDI that are also elements of∆): (∀e.D)I = {x ∈ ∆ |
∀y(y ∈ x → y ∈ DI)}, that is, (∀e.D)I = {x ∈ ∆ | x ⊆ DI)} = Pow(DI) ∩∆ =
(Pow(D))I , as expected.
4.1 Translating TBox, ABox, and queries
We define a new TBox, T T , by introducing, for each inclusion C ⊑ D in T , the in-
clusion CT ⊑ DT in T T . Additionally, for each (complex) concept C occurring in the
knowledge base K (or in the query) on the l.h.s. of a membership axiom C ∈ D or
(C,D) ∈ R, we extend NI with a new individual name
2 eC and we add in T
T the
concept equivalence:
CT ≡ ∃e−.{eC}. (1)
From now on, new individual names such as eC will be called concept individual names.
This equivalence is intended to capture the property that, in all the models I = 〈∆, ·I〉
of KT , eIC is in relation e
I with all and only the instances of concept CT , i.e., for all
y ∈ ∆, (eIC , y) ∈ e
I if and only if y ∈ (CT )I .
As in the case of the power-set constructor, this fact can be verified by analyzing
the semantics of ∃e−.{eC}:
(∃e−.{eC})
I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∃y((x, y) ∈ (e−)I ∧ y ∈ ({eC})
I},
2 The symbol eC should remind the e-xtension of C.
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which, recalling that e stands for ∋ and interpreting the nominal, will stand for
(∃e−.{eC})
I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∃y(x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ {eIC}} = {x ∈ ∆ | x ∈ e
I
C},
which, by concept equivalence (1), is as to say that eIC and (C
T )I have the same exten-
sion.
Remark 1. It is important to notice that every concept individual name of the sort eC
introduced above—that is, every individual name whose purpose is that of providing a
name to the extension of CI—, in general turns out to be in relation e with other ele-
ments of the domain ∆ of I (unless C is an inconsistent concept and its extension is
empty). This is in contrast with the assumption relative to other “standard” individual
names a ∈ NI , for which we will require (¬∃e.⊤)(a) (see below) as they are inter-
preted as atoms.
We define AT as the set of assertions containing:
- for each concept membership axiom C ∈ D in A, the assertionDT (eC),
- for each role membership axiom (C,D) ∈ R in A, the assertion R(eC , eD),
- for each assertionD(a) in A, the assertionDT (a),
- for each assertion R(a, b) in A, the assertion R(a, b) and, finally,
- for each (standard) individual name a ∈ NI , the assertion (¬∃e.⊤)(a).
As noticed above, the last requirement forces all named individuals (in the language
of K) to be interpreted as domain elements which are not in relation e with any other
element.
LetKT = (T T ,AT ) be the knowledge base obtained by translatingK intoALCOI.
Example 2. LetK = (T ,A) be the knowledge base considered above:
T = {RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(CannotHunt)} and
A = {Eagle(harry),Eagle ∈ RedListSpecies , PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ∈ RedListSpecies}.
By the translation above, we obtain:
T T = {RedListSpecies ⊑ ∀e.CannotHunt ,
Eagle ≡ ∃e−.{eEagle}, PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ≡ ∃e−.{ePolarCreature⊓Bear} }
AT = {Eagle(harry),RedListSpecies(eEagle ),RedListSpecies(ePolarCreature⊓Bear),
(¬∃e.⊤)(harry) }
KT entails CannotHunt(harry) in ALCOI . In fact, from RedListSpecies(eEagle)
and Red- ListSpecies ⊑ ∀e.CannotHunt , it follows that, in all models ofKT , eIEagle
∈ (∀e.Cannot - Hunt)I . Furthermore, from Eagle ≡ ∃e−.{eEagle} and the asser-
tion Eagle(harry), it follows that (eIEagle , harry
I ) ∈ eI holds. Hence, harryI ∈
CannotHunt I . As this holds in all models of KT , CannotHunt(harry) is a logical
consequence of KT . It is easy to see that Eagle ⊑ CannotHunt follows from KT as
well.
Let F be a query of the form C ⊑ D, C(a) or C ∈ D We assume that all the
individual names, concept names and role names occurring in F also occur in K and
we define a translation FT of the query F as follows:
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- if F is a subsumption C ⊑ D, then FT is the subsumption CT ⊑ DT ;
- if F is an assertion C(a), then FT is the assertion CT (a);
- if F is a membership axiom C ∈ D ((C ,D) ∈ R, respectively), then FT is
the assertionDT (eC) (R(eC , eD ), respectively).
In the following we prove the soundness and completeness of the translation of an
ALCΩ knowledge base into ALCOI .
Proposition 1 (Soundness of the translation). The translation of an ALCΩ knowl-
edge baseK = (T ,A) into ALCOI is sound, that is, for any query F :
KT |=ALCOI F
T ⇒ K |=ALCΩ F.
Proof. (Sketch) By contraposition, assume K 6|=ALCΩ F and let I = 〈∆, ·
I〉 be a
model of K in ALCΩ that falsifies F . ∆ is a transitive set living in a model of Ω with
universe U . We build an ALCOI interpretation I ′ = 〈∆′, ·I
′
〉, which is going to be a
model ofKT falsifying F in ALCOI , by letting:
-∆′ = ∆;
- for all B ∈ NC , BI
′
= BI ;
- for all roles R ∈ NR, RI
′
= RI ;
- for all x, y ∈ ∆′, (x, y) ∈ eI
′
if and only if y ∈ x;
- for all (standard) individual name a ∈ NI , aI
′
= aI ∈ A ∩∆;
- for all eC ∈ NI , e
I′
C = C
I .
The interpretation I ′ is well defined. First, the interpretation BI
′
of a named concept
B is a subset of ∆′ as expected. In fact, for each x ∈ BI
′
, x ∈ BI ⊆ ∆ = ∆′. Also,
aI
′
= aI ∈ ∆ = ∆′. It is easy to see that the interpretation of constant eC , eI
′
C is in∆
′.
In fact, as the named individual eC has been added by the translation to the language of
KT , there must be some membership axiom C ∈ D (or (C,D) ∈ R) inK , for someD
(respectively, for someD and R). Considering the case that axiom C ∈ D is inK , as I
is a model ofK , I satisfies C ∈ D, so that CI ∈ DI must hold. However, as DI ⊆ ∆,
it must be CI ∈ ∆. Hence, by construction, eI
′
C = C
I ∈ ∆′ = ∆. In case (C,D) ∈ R,
it must hold that (CI , DI) ∈ RI . As RI ⊆ ∆ × ∆, then CI , DI ∈ ∆. In particular,
eI
′
C = C
I ∈ ∆′ = ∆.
We can prove by induction on the structural complexity of the concepts that, for all
x ∈ ∆′,
x ∈ (CT )I
′
if and only if x ∈ CI (2)
and show that all the axioms and assertions inKT are satisfied in I ′, and FT is falsified
in I ′. ✷
Before proving completeness of the translation of ALCΩ into ALCOI , we show that,
if the translationKT of a knowledge baseK has a model inALCOI , then it has a finite
model.
Proposition 2. Let K be a knowledge base in ALCΩ and let KT be its translation in
ALCOI . IfKT has a model in ALCOI , then it has a finite model.
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Proof. We prove this result by providing an alternative (but equivalent) translation
KT (¬) ofK in the description logicALC(¬), using a single negated role ¬e.
ALC(¬) extends ALC with role complement operator, where, for any role R, the
role ¬R is the negation of role R, where (x, y) ∈ (¬R)I if and only if (x, y) 6∈ RI .
In the translation, we exploit ¬e to capture non-membership, where (x, y) ∈ (¬e)I if
and only if (x, y) 6∈ eI (i.e., in set terms, y 6∈ x). Decidability of concept satisfiability
in ALC(¬) has been proved by Lutz and Sattler in [24]. The finite model property
of a language with a single negated role ¬e can be proved as done in [12] (Section
2) for a logic with the “window modality”, by standard filtration, extended to deal with
additional K-modalities (for the other roles) as in the proof in [4]. Indeed, as observed in
[24], the “window operator” studied in [12] is strongly related to a negated modality,
as φ can be written as [¬R]¬φ.
The translationKT (¬) can be definedmodifyingKT by replacing the concept equiv-
alence CT ≡ ∃e−.{eC} with the assertions: (∀e.CT )(eC) and (∀(¬e).(¬CT ))(eC).
One can show that from any model I = (∆, ·I) of KT (¬) we can easily define
a model of KT in ALCOI , and vice-versa—considering the usual interpretation of
negated roles, inverse roles and nominals. In fact, the semantics of the assertion (∀e.CT )
(eC) is the following: for all x ∈ ∆, (e
I
C , x) ∈ e
I ⇒ x ∈ (CT )I , which is equivalent
to ∃e−.{eC} ⊑ CT .
The semantics of the assertion (∀(¬e).(¬CT ))(eC) is: for all x ∈ ∆, (e
I
C , x) 6∈
eI ⇒ x 6∈ (CT )I , i.e., for all x ∈ ∆, x ∈ (CT )I ⇒ (eIC , x) ∈ e
I , which is the
semantics of CT ⊑ ∃e−.{eC}.
We conclude the proof by observing that, if KT has a model in ALCOI , there is
a model of KT (¬). Then, by the finite model property of ALC(¬), KT (¬) must have a
finite model, from which a finite model ofKT can be defined. ✷
As a byproduct of the above proposition, we have that any ALCΩ knowledge base K
has a translation KT (¬) in the description logic ALC(¬), which uses a single negated
role ¬e, and that each model of KT (¬) can be mapped to a corresponding ALCOI
model ofKT , and vice-versa.
To conclude our analysis we now prove the completeness of the translation KT of
a knowledge baseK in ALCOI .
Proposition 3 (Completeness of the translation). The translation of anALCΩ knowl-
edge baseK = (T ,A) into ALCOI is complete, that is, for any query F :
K |=ALCΩ F ⇒ K
T |=ALCOI F
T .
Proof. We prove the completeness of the translation by contraposition. LetKT 6|=ALCOI
FT . Then there is a model I = 〈∆, ·I〉 of KT in ALCOI such that I falsifies F . We
show that we can build a model J = 〈Λ, ·J〉 of K in ALCΩ , where the domain Λ is a
transitive set in the universe HF1/2(A) consisting of all the hereditarily finite rational
hypersets built from atoms in A = {a0, a1, . . .}. As a matter of fact, the domain Λ is
to be extended possibly duplicating sets representing extensionally equal but pairwise
distinct sets/elements in∆.
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We define Λ starting from the graph3 G = 〈∆, eI〉, whose nodes are the elements
of ∆ and whose arcs are the pairs (x, y) ∈ eI . Notice that, by Proposition 2, the graph
G can be assumed to be finite. Intuitively, an arc from x to y in G stands for the fact
that y ∈ x.
At this point, let ∆0 = {d1, . . . , dm} be the elements of ∆ which, in the model
I = 〈∆, ·I〉, are not in relation eI with any other element in∆ and are non equal to the
interpretation of any concept individual name eC (that is, dj ∈ ∆0 iff there is no y such
that (dj , y) ∈ eI and there is no concept C such that dj = eIC ). We define theM(d)’s
for d ∈ ∆, as the hypesets satisfying the following collection of set-theoretic equations:
M(d) =
{
ak if d = dk ∈ ∆0,{
M(d′) | (d, d′) ∈ eI
}
otherwise.
(3)
Observe that, for the concepts C occurring as l.h.s. of membership axioms, as axiom
CT = ∃e−.{eC} is satisfied in the model I of KT , it holds that d′ ∈ (CT )I iff
(eIC , d
′) ∈ eI . Therefore, for d = eIC , M(d) = M(e
I
C) =
{
M(d′) | (eIC , d
′) ∈ eI
}
=
{
M(d′) | d′ ∈ (CT )I
}
.
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets inHF1/2(A). This follows from
the fact that all finite systems of (finite) set-theoretic equations have a solution in
HF
1/2(A).4
To complete the definition of J = 〈Λ, ·J 〉 in such a way to prove that J is a model
ofK in ALCΩ falsifying F , we put:
- Λ = {M(d) | d ∈ ∆};
- for all B ∈ NC , BJ = {M(d) | d ∈ BI};
- for all roles R ∈ NR such that R 6= e, RJ = {(M(d),M(d′)) | (d, d′) ∈ RI};
- for all standard named individuals a ∈ NI such that aI = dk, let aJ = M(dk) =
ak ∈ A.
By construction, Λ is transitive set in a modelM of Ω (in fact, for all M(d) ∈ Λ, if
M(d′) ∈ M(d), then (d′, d) ∈ eI and then d′ ∈ ∆; therefore,M(d′) ∈ Λ). Moreover,
it can be proved, by induction on the structural complexity of concepts, that, for all
x ∈ ∆:
M(x) ∈ CJ if and only if x ∈ (CT )I . (4)
Let us consider the interesting case: C = Pow(D). By definition of T , we have that:
(CT )I = ((Pow(D))T )I = (∀e.DT )I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∀y((x, y) ∈ eI → y ∈ (DT )I}
andCJ = (Pow(D))J = Pow (DJ )∩Λ. Consider, for x ∈ ∆,M(x) ∈ Pow(DJ )∩Λ,
which is as to say that M(x) ⊆ DJ . All the elements of M(x) are of the form M(y)
3 Strictly speaking the graph G introduced here is not really necessary: it is just mentioned to
single out the membership relation ∈ from eI more clearly.
4 When eI is a well-founded relation, M(·) is its inductively defined set-theoretic “rendering”
going under the name of Mostowski collapse of eI (see [21]). As a consequence of the dupli-
cation of extensionally equal sets, not only we have the trivial property that, for d, d′ ∈ ∆,
d = d′ implies M(d) = M(d′), but also the converse implication, i.e., M(d) = M(d′)
implies d = d′.
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for some y ∈ ∆, therefore we have that:
∀M(y)(M(y) ∈M(x)→M(y) ∈ DJ ),
which, by definition ofM(·) and by inductive hypothesis, means that:
∀y((x, y) ∈ eI → y ∈ (DT )I),
which means x ∈ (∀e.DT )I = ((Pow(D))T )I and proves (4) in this case.
From (4) it is easy to prove that all axioms and assertions inK are satisfied in J . ✷
As the translation of ALCΩ into ALCOI is polynomial (actually, linear) in the size of
the knowledge base (and of the query) the following complexity result follows.
Proposition 4. Concept satisfiability in ALCΩ is an EXPTIME-complete problem.
The hardness comes from the EXPTIME-hardness of concept satisfiability inALC with
general TBox [30,2]. The upper bound comes from the EXPTIME upper bound for
SHOI [18].
5 A set theoretic translation ofALCΩ
To translate ALCΩ in Ω, we exploit the polymodal version of the correspondence be-
tween ∈ and the accessibility relation of a normal modality studied in [10] and used
above. We start modifying our previously introduced translation of ALC along the line
used by D’Agostino et al. to deal with normal, complete finitely axiomatizable poly-
modal logics [10]. Then, we use the well known correspondence between description
logics and modal logics studied by Schild [30], where concepts (sets of elements) play
the role of propositions (sets of worlds) in the polymodal logic, while universal and
existential restrictions ∀R and ∃R play the role of universal and existential modalities
✷i and ✸i.
In Section 5.2 we focus on the fragment ofALCΩ admitting no roles, no individual
names and no existential and universal restrictions, that we call LCΩ . We show that
LCΩ can be given a simple set-theoretic translation in Ω. Finally, in Section 5.3, we
see that this set-theoretic translation can be naturally extended to the full ALCΩ . In
particular, we encodeALCΩ into its fragmentLCΩ , showing that LCΩ is as expressive
as ALCΩ and providing a set-theoretic translation of ALCΩ in which ∀Ri.C and the
power-set concept Pow(C) are encoded in a uniform way.
5.1 A set theoretic translation ofALC with empty ABox
Let R1, . . . , Rk be the roles occurring in the knowledge base K = (T ,A) and let
A1, . . . , An be the concept names occurring in K . Given a concept C of ALC, built
from the concept names and role names in K , its set-theoretic translation is a set-
theoretic term CS(x, y1, . . . , yk, x1, . . . , xn), where x, y1, . . . , yk, x1, . . . , xn are set-
theoretic variables, inductively defined as follows:
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⊤S = x; ⊥S = ∅;
ASi = xi , for Ai inK; (¬C)
S = x\CS ;
(C ⊓D)S = CS ∩DS ; (C ⊔D)S = CS ∪DS ;
(∀Ri.C)
S = Pow(((x ∪ y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk)\yi) ∪ Pow(C
S)), for Ri inK;
(∃Ri.C)S is translated to the set-theoretic term (¬∀Ri.¬C)S . Each ALC concept C
is represented by a set-theoretic term CS and interpreted as a set in each model of Ω.
Membership is used to give an interpretation of roles, as for modalities in the polymodal
logics in [10].
For a single roleR, by imitating the relationRI with ∈ (where v ∈ u corresponds to
(u, v) ∈ RI), we naturally obtain that Pow(C) corresponds to the universal restriction
∀R.C. For multiple roles, in order to encode the different relations R1, . . . , Rk, k sets
Ui are considered. Informally, each set Ui (represented by the variable yi) is such that
(v, v′) ∈ RIi iff there is some ui ∈ Ui such that ui ∈ v and v
′ ∈ ui.
Given an ALC knowledge baseK = (T ,A) with A = ∅, we define the translation
of the TBox axioms as follows:
TBox T (x, y1, . . . , yk, x1, . . . , xk) = {CS1 ∩ x ⊆ C
S
2 | C1 ⊑ C2 ∈ T }
We can then establish a correspondence between subsumption inALCΩ and derivability
in the set theoryΩ, instantiating the result of Theorem 5 in [10] as follows:
Proposition 5. For all concepts C andD on the language of the theoryK:
K |=ALC C ⊑ D if and only if
Ω ⊢ ∀x∀y1 . . . ∀yk(Trans2(x)→ ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
TBox T → CS ∩ x ⊆ DS))
where Trans2(x) stands for ∀y∀z(y ∈ z∧z ∈ x→ y ⊆ x), that is, x ⊆ Pow(Pow(x)).
The validity of Trans2(x) on the set x, which here represents the domain∆ of anALC
interpretation, is required, as in the polymodal case in [10], to guarantee that elements
accessible throughRi turn out to be themselves in x.
Roughly speaking, the meaning of Proposition 5 is that, for all instances of x repre-
senting the domain∆ and for all the instancesU1, . . . , Uk of the set variables y1, . . . , yk,
any choice for the interpretation x1, . . . , xn of the concept names A1, . . . , An in K
which satisfies the TBox axioms over the elements in x (i.e., over the domain ∆), also
satisfies the inclusion CS ⊆ DS over∆.
From the correspondence of the logic ALC with the normal polymodal logic Km
in [30] and from the soundness and completeness of the set-theoretic translation for
normal polymodal logics (Theorems 17 and 18 in [10]), we can conclude that, forALC ,
the set-theoretic translation above is sound and complete.
This set-theoretic translation can then be extended to other constructs of descrip-
tion logics including a set of axioms AxiomH(x, y1, . . . , yk), as in [10] to provide the
translation of the specific axioms of a polymodal logic, as follows:
∀x∀y1 . . . ∀yk(Trans2(x) ∧ AxiomH(x, y1, . . . , yk)
→ ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
TBox T → CS ∩ x ⊆ DS))
In the following, we consider a few examples and we let for future work the develop-
ment of a set-theoretic characterizations for more expressive DLs.
Role hierarchy axioms have the form Rj ⊑ Ri, and semantic condition RIj ⊆ R
I
i .
They can be captured by adding in AxiomH(x, y1, . . . , yk) the condition yj ⊆ yi.
18 Laura Giordano and Alberto Policriti
Transitivity of a roleRi, Trans(Ri), which corresponds to the role inclusion axiom
Ri ◦Ri ⊑ Ri, can be captured adding the following axiom in AxiomH(x, y1, . . . , yk):
∀y, u, v, u′, z(y ∈ x→ ((u ∈ y ∧ u ∈ yi ∧ v ∈ u ∧ u′ ∈ v ∧ u′ ∈ yi ∧ z ∈ u′)
→ ∃u′′(u′′ ∈ y ∧ u′′ ∈ yi ∧ z ∈ u
′′)))
encoding the semantic property ∀y, v, z((y, v) ∈ RIi ∧ (v, z) ∈ R
I
i → (y, z) ∈ R
I
i ).
Inverse roles: Let a role Rj be the inverse of Ri (i.e., Rj = R
−
i ). The semantic
condition (v, y) ∈ RIj if and only if (y, v) ∈ R
I
i can be encoded by the axiom:
∀y, v(y ∈ x→ (∃u(u ∈ y ∧ u ∈ yj ∧ v ∈ u)↔ ∃u′(u′ ∈ v ∧ u′ ∈ yi ∧ y ∈ u′)))
A similar axiom can be defined for complex role inclusions. A direct translation of
nominals, {a}, would require a set theory with singleton operators.
5.2 A set-theoretic translation of the fragmentLCΩ
In this section we focus on the fragmentLCΩ ofALCΩ without roles, individual names,
universal and existential restrictions and role assertions, and we show that it can be
given a simple set-theoretic translation in Ω. This translation provides some insight on
the nature of the power-set construct in ALCΩ .
We call LCΩ the fragment, whose concepts are defined inductively as follows:
- A ∈ NC , ⊤ and ⊥ are LC
Ω concepts;
- if C,D are LCΩ concepts, then the following are LCΩ concepts:
C ⊓D,C ⊔D,¬C,C\D,Pow(C)
The semantics of concept constructs in LCΩ is the same as in ALCΩ . An LCΩ knowl-
edge baseK is a pair (T ,A), where the TBox T is a set of concept inclusions C ⊑ D,
and the ABox A is a set of membership axioms C ∈ D. The notions of satisfiability of
a knowledge baseK and entailment formK are defined as in ALCΩ .
Given an LCΩ knowledge baseK = (T ,A), let A1, . . . , An be the concept names
occurring inK . We define a translation of an LCΩ conceptC over the language ofK to
a set-theoretic term CS(x, x1, . . . , xn), where x, x1, . . . , xn are set-theoretic variables,
by induction on the structure of concepts, as follows:
⊤S = x; ⊥S = ∅; ASi = xi, for i = 1, . . . , n;
(¬C)S = x\CS ; (C ⊓D)S = CS ∩DS ; (C ⊔D)S = CS ∪DS ; (C\D)S = CS\DS;
(Pow(C))S = Pow(CS).
LetK = (T ,A). The translation for the TBox T and ABox A is defined as follows:
TBoxT (x, x1, . . . , xn) = {C
S
1 ∩ x ⊆ C
S
2 | C1 ⊑ C2 ∈ T }
ABoxA(x, x1, . . . , xn) = {CS1 ∈ C
S
2 ∩ x | (C1 ∈ C2) ∈ A}
We can now establish a correspondence between subsumption in LCΩ and derivability
in Ω.
Proposition 6 (Soundness and Completeness of the translation of LCΩ). For all
concepts C andD on the language of the knowledge baseK:
K |=LCΩ C ⊑ D if and only if
Ω |= ∀x(Trans(x)→ ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBox T → C
S ∩ x ⊆ DS))
where Trans(x) stands for ∀y(y ∈ x→ y ⊆ x), that is, x ⊆ Pow(x).
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Proof. (Sketch) (⇒) By contraposition, suppose there is a modelM ofΩ, with universe
U over A, which falsifies the formula: ∀x(Trans(x) → ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧∧
TBox T → C
S ∩ x ⊆ DS)). Then there must be some u ∈ U , such that Trans(x)
[u/x] is satisfied in M, while (∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBoxT → CS ∩ x ⊆
DS)))[u/x] is falsified inM.
Hence, there must be v1, . . . , vn in U , such that (
∧
ABoxA∧
∧
TBox T )[u/x, v/x]
is satisfied inM, while (CS∩x ⊆ DS)[u/x, v/x] is falsified inM. Let β = [u/x, v/x].
We define an LCΩ interpretation I = (∆, ·I), as follows:∆ = u; AIi = vi ∩ u, for
all i = 1, . . . , n such that Ai occurs inK; and A
I = ∅ for all other A ∈ NC .
I is well-defined. By construction,∆ is a transitive set living in the universe U of theΩ
modelM, and AIi ⊆ ∆. We can prove by structural induction that, for all the concepts
C built from the concept names inK , for the variable substitution β = [u/x, v/x], and
for all w ∈ ∆:
w ∈ CI if and only if w ∈ (CS)Mβ (5)
This equivalence can be used to prove that the ALCΩ interpretation I is a model of K ,
which falsifies the inclusion C ⊑ D. Hence,K 6|=ALCΩ C ⊑ D.
(⇐) By contraposition, let I = (∆, ·I) be LCΩ model ofK , falsifying the inclusion
C ⊑ D. By construction, ∆ is a transitive set living in the universe U of an Ω model
M. We show thatM falsifies the formula:
∀x(Trans(x)→ ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBox T → C
S ∩ x ⊆ DS)) (6)
Let β be the variable substitution β = [u/x, v/x], where: u = ∆ and vj = A
I
j , for all
j = 1, . . . , n. We can prove, by induction on the structure of the concept C, that for all
the concepts C built from the concept names inK , and for all d ∈ ∆:
d ∈ CI if and only if d ∈ (CS)Mβ
This equivalence can be used to prove that the formula (6) is falsified inM, by showing
that: (
∧
ABoxA∧
∧
TBox T )
M
β is satisfied inM and that (C
S∩x ⊆ DS)Mβ is falsified
inM. ✷
A similar correspondence result can be proved for instance checking, by replacing the
inclusion CS ∩ x ⊆ DS in Proposition 7 with CS ∈ DS ∩ x.
As we can see from the translation above, the power-set construct in LCΩ is defined
precisely as the set-theoretic power-set. From the translation it is clear that only the
part of the power-set which is in the set x (the domain ∆) is relevant when evaluating
the axioms in K or a query. In particular, the axioms in the knowledge base are only
required to be satisfied over the elements of the transitive set x. Notice that it is the
same in the set-theoretic translation ofALC in Section 5.1: knowledge base axioms are
required to be satisfied on the elements of x.
Observe also that, in both the translations of ALC and of LCΩ , ⊤ is interpreted
as the transitive set x. It would not be correct to interpret ⊤ as the universe U of a
model of Ω, as U is not a set. In fact, Pow(⊤) is in the language of concepts and
(Pow(⊤))I = Pow(⊤I) ∩∆. However, Pow(⊤I) is not defined for ⊤I = U , as U is
not a set.
20 Laura Giordano and Alberto Policriti
5.3 TranslatingALCΩ by encoding into LCΩ
In this section we show that LCΩ has the same expressive power asALCΩ , as universal
and existential restrictions of the language ALCΩ (as well as role assertions) can be
encoded into LCΩ . This encoding, together with the set-theoretic translation of LCΩ
given in the previous section, determines a set-theoretic translation forALCΩ , in which
roles are—ultimately—translated as in the polymodal translation in [10], and the power-
set construct is translated accordingly.
Given an ALCΩ knowledge base K = (T ,A), let R1, . . . , Rk be the role names
occurring in K , A1, . . . , An the concept names occurring in K , and a1, . . . , ar the
individual names occurring in K . We introduce k new concept names U1, . . . , Uk in
the language, one for each roleRi. These concepts (which are not concept names inK)
will be used to encode universal restrictions ∀Ri.C as well as the power-set concept
Pow(C) of ALCΩ into LCΩ . We further introduce a new concept name Bi for each
individual name ai occurring in K , a new concept name F
i
h,j for each role assertion
Ri(ah, aj) and a new concept nameG
i
Ch,Cj
each role membership axiom Ri(Ch, Cj).
For an ALCΩ concept C, the encoding CE in LCΩ can be defined by recursively
replacing: every named individual ai with the new concept name Bi, every subconcept
∀Ri.C with (∀Ri.C)E and every subconcept Pow(C) with (Pow(C))E , as defined
below, while the encoding E commutes with concept constructors in all other cases. In
particular, we let:
• aEi = Bi, for all i = 1, . . . , r;
• AE = A, for all concept names A occurring inK;
• (∀Ri.C)E = Pow(¬Ui ⊔ Pow(CE))
• (Pow(C))E = Pow(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk ⊔ CE)
The encoding of ∀Ri.C is based on the same idea as the set-theoretic encoding of ∀Ri.C
in Section 5.1. For each (∀Ri.C)E-element y we require that, for all y′ ∈ y which are
in Ui, all the elements z in y
′ areCE -elements. For the power-set, for each (Pow(C))E -
element y, we require that all its elements y′ ∈ y, which are notU1⊔ . . .⊔Uk-elements,
are CE -elements. We cannot simply define (Pow(C))E as Pow(CE), as it is necessary
to keep the encodings of ∀Ri.C and Pow(C) (both based on the set-theoretic power-set)
independent of each other.
Given an ALCΩ knowledge base K , and a query F (over the language of K), we
need to define the encoding KE of K , and the encoding FE of the query F in LCΩ .
KE contains:
- an inclusion axiom CE ⊓ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk) ⊑ DE , for each C ⊑ D ∈ K;5
- a membership axiom CE ∈ DE for each C ∈ D inK;
- a membership axiom aEi ∈ C
E for each C(ai) in K;
- membership axioms F ih,j ∈ a
E
h , a
E
j ∈ F
i
h,j and F
i
h,j ∈ Ui for all Ri(ah, aj) inK;
- axiomsGiCh,Cj ∈ C
E
h , C
E
j ∈ G
i
Ch,Cj
andGiCh,Cj ∈ Ui for all Ri(Ch, Cj) inK .
6
5 Inclusion axioms are only required to hold on domain elements which are not Ui-elements.
6 To translate the assertion Ri(ah, aj), we need an element u of Ui such that u is an instance of
aEh and a
E
j is an instance of u. We call such an element F
i
h,j . Similarly for role membership
axioms Ri(Ch, Cj). A more direct encoding of role assertions would be possible in the pres-
ence of nominals (i.e., if nominals were admitted in the languages of LCΩ and ALCΩ) as, for
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The following additional axioms are also needed inKE :
Ai ⊑ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk), one for each concept name Ai inK;
Bi ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk), one for each individual name ai in K;
CE ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . .⊔Uk), one for each C on the l.h.s of a membership inK or in the
query;
¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk) ⊑ Pow(¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk) ⊔ Pow(¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)))
The first three axioms avoid that concept names Ai and Bi, and the concepts C occur-
ring on the l.h.s. of membership axioms, are interpreted as elements of Uj , for some j.
The last axiom enforces the property that: for each z ∈ ∆\(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)I , if u ∈ z,
for an instance u of some Ui, and v ∈ u, then v ∈ ∆\(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)I (we call this
axiom Trans2(∆\(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)
I ).
For a query F over the language of the knowledge base K , if F is an inclusion
C ⊑ D, its translation is CE ⊑ DE ; if F is an assertion C(ai), its translation is
aEi ∈ C
E ; if F is a membership axioms C ∈ D, its translation is CE ∈ DE .
Example 3. To see an example of the encoding above, let us consider a variant of knowl-
edge base in Example 2. LetK = (T ,A) where:
T = {RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(CannotHunt), Eagle ⊑ ∀hasMother .Eagle,
RedListSpecies ⊑ ∀hasScientificName.Name}
A = {Eagle(harry),Eagle ∈ RedListSpecies , PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ∈ RedListSpecies ,
(PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ,Eagle) ∈ moreEndangered}
By the translation above, we obtain the following LCΩ knowledge baseKE :
RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(UhasMother ⊔UhasSciName ⊔ CannotHunt),
Eagle ⊑ Pow(¬UhasMother ⊔ Pow(Eagle)),
RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(¬UhasSciName ⊔ Pow(Name)),
Bharry ∈ Eagle , Eagle ∈ RedListSpecies , PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ∈ RedListSpecies ,
Eagle ∈ GmEPB ,E , G
mE
PB ,E ∈ PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ,
Eagle ⊑ ¬(UhasMother ⊔ UhasSciName), and the same for the other concept names
Bharry ∈ ¬(UhasMother ⊔ UhasSciName),
PolarCreature ⊓ Bear ∈ ¬(UhasMother ⊔ UhasSciName),
whereGmEPB,E is the concept name specifically introduced for encoding (PolarCreature
⊓Bear ,Eagle) ∈ moreEndangered . The transitivity axiom Trans2 is omitted.
We can prove the soundness and completeness of the encoding of ALCΩ into LCΩ .
Proposition 7 (Soundness and Completeness of the encoding ofALCΩ in LCΩ).
K |=ALCΩ F if and only ifK
E |=LCΩ F
E
Proof. (⇐) The soundness is proved by contraposition. Assume that K 6|=ALCΩ F ,
then, there is a model I = (∆, ·I) ofK such that F is falsified in I .
For the finite model property of ALCΩ , we can assume without loss of generality
that the model I is finite. To build from I a finite LCΩ model J = (∆′, ·J) of KE
which falsifies FE , we define a graph G = (N,E) where: N = ∆ ∪ D1 ∪ . . . ∪ Dk
andDi = {uis,t | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ (s, t) ∈ R
I
i }. E is defined as follows:
instance, Ri(ah, bj) could be equivalently written as ah ∈ ∃Ri.{aj}. However, this would
require moving to a set theory with singleton operators.
22 Laura Giordano and Alberto Policriti
E =
⋃k
i=1{(s, u
i
s,t), (u
i
s,t, t) | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ (s, t) ∈ R
I
i } ∪ {(s, t) | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ t ∈ s}
We define an injection pi from the leaves of N , i.e. nodes without any successor, to A
and, for any given d ∈ N , we define the following hypersetM(d):
M(d) =
{
pi(d) if d is a leaf of N,
{M(d′) | (d, d′) ∈ E} otherwise.
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets in HF1/2(A).
Let Λ = {M(d) | d ∈ N}, possibly extended by duplicating M(d)’s to represent
extensionally-equal (bisimilar) sets corresponding to pairwise distinct elements in N .
As a consequence, as in previous cases, for d, d′ ∈ N , d = d′ if and only if M(d) =
M(d′), i.e., there are distinct sets in Λ for pairwise distinct elements of N .
Observe that, by definition of Λ, if (s, t) ∈ RIi , for s, t ∈ ∆, then there is some
d ∈ Di, such thatM(d) ∈ M(s) andM(t) ∈ M(d) (and, in particular, d = uis,t); and
vice-versa.
We define J = 〈∆′, ·J〉 as follows:
- ∆′ = Λ;
- AJ = {M(d) | d ∈ AI} for all A ∈ NC , in the language of ALC
Ω;
- BJi = M(a
I
i ) = pi(a
I
i ), i = 1, . . . , r;
- UJi = {M(u
i
s,t) | s, t ∈ ∆ and (s, t) ∈ R
I
i };
- (F ih,j)
J =M(ui
aI
h
,aI
j
);
- (GiCh,Cj)
J =M(uis,t), for s = C
I
h and t = C
I
j .
By construction,∆′ is transitive set in a modelM ofΩ. Notice that BJi = M(a
I
i ) ∈ A,
and hence BJi has no elements. Notice also that, in the definition of (G
i
Ch,Cj
)J , s and
t are elements of ∆ and (s, t) ∈ RIi , so that u
i
s,t ∈ E. In fact, s = C
I
h and t = C
I
j and
Ri(Ch, Cj) is inA. Therefore, as I satisfies the ABoxA, (CIh, C
I
j ) ∈ R
I
i ⊆ ∆×∆, and
CIh, C
I
j ∈ ∆. In the following, we letM(Di) = {M(u
i
s,t) | s, t ∈ ∆ and (s, t) ∈ R
I
i }.
It can be shown by induction on the structural complexity of concepts, that, for all
d ∈ ∆, for all concepts C occurring inK (or F ):
d ∈ CI if and only ifM(d) ∈ (CE)J ,
which can be used to prove that J is a model ofKE that falsifies FE , so thatKE 6|=LCΩ
FE .
(⇒) (Sketch) By contraposition, assume thatKE 6|=LCΩ F
E , then, there is an LCΩ
model J = (∆, ·J ) ofKE such that FE is falsified in J .
For the finite model property of LCΩ (which is a fragment of ALCΩ), we can as-
sume without loss of generality that the model J is finite. We build from J an ALCΩ
model I = (∆′, ·I) ofK which falsifies F , defining∆′ as a transitive set in the universe
HF
1/2(A) consisting of all the hereditarily finite rational hypersets built from atoms in
A = {a0, a1, . . .}.
We start from the graphG = (N,E), with nodesN = ∆\(UJ1 ∪ . . . ∪U
J
k ), whose
arcs are defined as follows:E = {(d1, d2) | d1, d2 ∈ N∧d2 ∈ d1}.G is finite. Observe
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that, for each ai in K , B
J
i ∈ N , by axiom Bi ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk). Similarly, for each
Ai inK , A
J
i ⊆ N .
We define an injection pi from the leaves of N (i.e. nodes without any successor)
plus the elementsBI1 , . . . , B
I
r ∈ N to A. For any given d ∈ N , we define the following
hypersetM(d):
M(d) =
{
pi(d) if d is a leaf of N or d = BJj for some j ,
{M(d′) | (d, d′) ∈ E} otherwise.
(7)
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets in HF1/2(A).
∆′ = {M(d) | d ∈ N}, possibly extended by duplicating M(d)’s to represent
extensionally-equal (bisimilar) sets corresponding to pairwise distinct elements in N .
We complete the definition of I = 〈∆′, ·I〉 as follows:
- AI = {M(d) |M(d) ∈ ∆′ ∧ d ∈ AJ}, for all A ∈ NC ;
- RIi = {(M(d),M(d
′)) |M(d),M(d′) ∈ ∆′ ∧ ∃u ∈ UJi (u ∈ d ∧ d
′ ∈ u)},
for all roles Ri occurring inK; R
I
i = ∅ for all other roles R ∈ NR;
- aIi = M(B
J
i ) = pi(B
J
i ) for all named individuals ai occurring in K;
aI = M(BJ1 ) for all other a ∈ NI .
By construction,∆′ is a transitive set in a modelM ofΩ. AsAJ ⊆ ∆\(UJ1 ∪. . .∪U
J
k ),
AIi ⊆ ∆
′. To complete the proof it can be shown that, for allM(d) ∈ ∆′, and C in K
(or in F ):
M(d) ∈ CI if and only if d ∈ (CE)J
which can be used to prove that J is a model ofK that falsifies F . ✷
Combining the above encoding and the set-theoretic translation for LCΩ of Section
5.2, we obtain a set-theoretic translation for ALCΩ .
Let R1, . . . , Rk and A1, . . . , An be, respectively, the roles and the concept names
occurring in the knowledge base K = (T ,A) (or in the query). Given a concept C
of ALCΩ , built from the concept, role and individual names in K , its set-theoretic
translation (CE)S is a set-theoretic term C∗(x, y1, . . . , yk, x1, . . . , xn+m), where we
let USi = yi, and we let the variables xn+1, . . . , xn+m to be the set-theoretic translation
of the additional concept names (Bj , F
i
h,j andG
i
Ch,Cj
) introduced to encode assertions.
C∗ is defined inductively as follows:
⊤∗ = x; ⊥∗ = ∅;
A∗i = xi , for Ai inK; (¬C)
∗ = x\CS ;
(C ⊓D)∗ = CS ∩DS ; (C ⊔D)∗ = CS ∪DS ;
(∀Ri.C)∗ = Pow((x\yi) ∪ Pow(C∗)); Pow(C)∗ = Pow(y1 ∪ . . . ∪
yk ∪ C
∗).
The translation of anALCΩ knowledge baseK can be defined accordingly, exploit-
ing the encoding E and S of the KB. In particular, let TBox ∗T and ABox
∗
A be the set-
theoretic translation of T andA, respectively. Observe that Trans2((x\(y1∪. . .∪yk)))
is inTBox ∗T . Also, for eachC1 ⊑ C2 ∈ T ,C
∗
1 ∩(x\(y1∪. . .∪yk)) ⊆ C
∗
2 is inTBox
∗
T .
ABox ∗A contains C
∗
1 ∈ C
∗
2 ∩ (x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk)), for each C1 ∈ C2 ∈ T (from
axioms CE1 ∈ C
E
2 and C
E ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk) in KE ) and, in addition, B∗i ∈
(x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk)), for each individual name ai occurring in A.
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A set-theoretic translation for subsumption in ALCΩ follows from the encoding E
and the set-theoretic translation S for LCΩ in Section 5.2 (see Proposition 7):
Corollary 1. K |=ALCΩ C ⊑ D if and only if
Ω |= ∀x, ∀y1, . . . , ∀yk(Trans(x)→
∀x1, . . . , ∀xn+m(
∧
ABox ∗A ∧
∧
TBox ∗T → C
∗ ∩ (x\(y1 ∪ . . .∪yk)) ⊆
D∗))
Rewriting TBox ∗T as Trans
2((x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk))) ∧ TBox
∗−
T
and observing that we
can factorise out Trans2((x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk))), we can put:
Ω |= ∀x, ∀y1, . . . , ∀yk(Trans(x) ∧ Trans2((x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk)))→
∀x1, . . . , ∀xn+m(
∧
ABox ∗A∧
∧
TBox ∗−T → C
∗∩ (x\(y1∪ . . .∪yk)) ⊆
D∗))
which makes it more evident that this set-theoretic translation of ALCΩ is a generaliza-
tion of the translations given in Section 5.1 and in Section 5.2.
When the power-set construct does not occur in the KB, and the language is re-
stricted to the language of ALC, it corresponds to the set-theoretic translation of ALC
in Section 5.1. Here, the set x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk) plays the role of x in ALC transla-
tion in Proposition 5. Condition Trans2(x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk)) correspondes to condition
Trans2(x). The inclusions C∗1 ∩ (x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk)) ⊆ C
∗
2 )) in TBox
∗
T (and in the
query) correspond to the inclusions C∗1 ∩ x ⊆ C
∗
2 )) ∈ TBoxT (and in the query).
Condition Trans(x) is useless (but harmless) in this case.
When there are no roles, no assertions and no universal and existential restrictions,
the set-theoretic variables y1, . . . , yn are useless. Let us consider the case when, in
the translation above, the interpretation of y1, . . . , yn is the empty set. In such a case,
x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk) = x and the the set-theoretic encoding above collapses to the set-
theoretic encoding of LCΩ in Proposition 6. In particular, condition Trans2(x\(y1 ∪
. . . ∪ yk)) becomes Trans2(x), which trivially follows from Trans(x).
The correspondence above provides a set-theoretic translation for ALC, which is
slightly different w.r.t. the translation in Section 5.1, directly obtained from the applica-
tion of the result for normal polymodal logics in [10] and from Schild’s characterization
ofALC as a polymodal logic [30]. The reason is that, in the encodingE above, the con-
cept names Ui, playing the role of the sets yi in the set-theoretic translation in Section
5.1, are in the language of LCΩ and hence are interpreted in ∆ as all other concept
names.
6 Discussion
We consider here some consequences of the above results in view of possible extensions
of the correspondence we introduced to deal with further DL constructs or set-theoretic
operators.
First of all, observe that the complementary problem to subsumption in ALCΩ is
satisfiability of a concept C with respect to a general knowledge base K (see Section
2.1). By the result in Corollary 1, this problem corresponds to the satisfiability of a
formula in the existential fragment of Ω, i.e. the satisfiability of a formula of Ω of the
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form ∃x, y1, . . . , yk, x1, . . . , xn+m φ, where φ is unquantified in the basic language of
Ω. In fact, we can reformulate Corollary 1 as follows:
K 6|=ALCΩ C ⊑ D ( i.e., C ⊓ ¬D is satisfiable in ALC
Ω with respect toK)
iff there is a model of Ω satisfying the formula:
∃x, ∃y1, . . . , ∃yk(Trans(x)∧
∃x1, . . . , ∃xn+m(
∧
ABox ∗A ∧
∧
TBox ∗T ∧¬(C
∗ ∩ (x\(y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk)) ⊆
D∗)))
where the quantifiers ∃x1, . . . , ∃xn+m can then be moved in front of the first parenthe-
sis, thus giving a formula in the existential fragment of (the language of) Ω.
The problem of deciding the satisfiability of existential formulae of the theory Ω
(without extensionality and well-foundedness) has not been studied so far, and our de-
cidability result for subsumption in ALCΩ comes from the translation of ALCΩ into
the description logicALCOI (Propositions 1 and 3 in Section 4). However, the satisfia-
bility of existential formulae with power-set relative to a set theory assuming extension-
ality and well-foundedness, has been proved to be decidable by Cantone et al. in [8]. As
a consequence, the same set-theoretic translation considered above brings us naturally
to a well-founded and extensional variant of ALCΩ . Let us elaborate on this point.
Start from the class of formulae “Multilevel syllogistic extended by the power-
set operator” (MLS+Pow for short) whose decidability has been studied in [8] under
the assumptions of extensionality and well-foundedness of the underlying set theory.
MLS+Pow consists of purely existential formulas with a matrix in the language of
Ω. Introduce (as we have done in Section 5.2 with LCΩ) a very simple description
logic, LCΩwe, which is (basically) a fragment ofMLS+Powwith extensionality and well-
foundedness. LCΩwe has the same syntax of LC
Ω and, from the semantic point of view,
models of LCΩwe can be defined as models of LC
Ω , with the additional requirements
of extensionality and well-foundedness. The decidability proof in [8] also provides a
finite-model result for LCΩwe.
A description logicALCΩwe, extendingALC with well-founded/extensional sets and
with the power-set operator, under the assumption of extensionality, can then be defined
and translated into its fragment LCΩwe, along the lines of our translation of ALC
Ω into
LCΩ . Indeed, the encoding in Section 5.3 of ALC roles by means of the membership
operator (using the power-set to capture the universal restriction) is still possible in the
case of well-founded sets, as ALC has the “tree-model property” (as the polymodal
logic Km [5]). From the semantic point of view, by well-foundednness, all circular
membership relationships among concepts are ruled out; by extensionality, any two
concepts in a model of ALCΩwe having the same elements, and such that the same
domain elements are accessible through the relations associated with roles Ri, have
to be considered equal. For instance, if we have a knowledge base containing the ax-
ioms Eagle ≡ Aquila and Eagle ∈ RedListSpecies, by extensionality we can con-
clude that Aquila ∈ RedListSpecies. Instead, in ALCΩ (without extensionality) the
concepts Eagle and Aquila may be interpreted as different sets in the models of the
knowledge base (i.e., EagleI 6= AquilaI), although they have the same elements. In
this case, as we have seen in Section 3, Aquila ∈ RedListSpecies does not follow
from the knowledge base.
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Further decidable existential fragments of set-theory have been studied, such as the
fragment with power-set and singleton operators [6,9], which opens the way to a set-
theoretic definition of other decidable extensions ofALC with well-founded sets. A nat-
ural question arising is whether these description logics with power-set, well-founded
sets and extensionality, can be translated as well into standard DLs and, in particular,
whether the extensionality and well-foundedness assumptions can be captured in stan-
dard DLs. We leave this investigation for future work.
Concerning the expressivity of ALCΩ with respect to standard DLs, the fact that
it has the finite model property already makes it evident that it cannot capture combi-
nations of constructs of expressive DLs which do not satisfy this property. On the one
hand, one can consider the problem of identifying a description logic (if any) having
the same expressivity asALCΩ and, on the other hand, one can face the problem of ex-
tending other description logics (including expressive ones) with power-set and concept
membership.
For the first point, it is not likely that the logic ALCOI can be translated into
ALCΩ . Indeed, while inverse roles can be encoded set-theoretically as in Section 5.1,
their encoding does not seem to be easily turned into a prenex universal formula so that,
with their addition, concept satisfiability (w.r.t. a knowledge base) seems to fall outside
the existential fragment of Ω.
As regards extending expressive DLs with power-set and concept membership, we
observe that their encoding using nominals and an inverse role of ALCOI , can be ex-
ploited in any DL extending ALC and including the above mentioned constructs. The
proof of soundness of the translation of ALCΩ in ALCOI (Proposition 1) indeed gen-
eralizes to other DLs, when extended with the power-set construct and concept mem-
bership in a similar way. Instead, alternative techniques would be needed for proving
completeness of the translation for such logics, as the proof of Proposition 3 exploits
the finite model property of ALCΩ which, in general, is not a property of expressive
DLs.
There are other useful constructs which could be borrowed from set-theory and
added to ALCΩ . One of them is the unary union,
⋃
C, namely, the union of all the
subsets of concept C. This construct could be introduced in ALCΩ with the semantic
condition (
⋃
C)I = {x ∈ y | y ∈ CI}. Let us consider again Example 1.
Example 4. Wemaywant to introduce an associationACME and state that all the mem-
bers of ACME participate to the SummerMeeting (in some group). Notice that, using
unary union, we can represent the set of all the participants to the SummerMeeting
as
⋃
SummerMeeting , We can state that all the members of ACME participate to the
summer meeting by the inclusion:
ACME ⊑
⋃
SummerMeeting
and that the members ofACME are all and the only participants to the summer meeting
by ACME ≡
⋃
SummerMeeting .
ALCΩ can be easily extended with the construct of unary union
⋃
C. On the one hand,
this construct has a natural translation into ALCOI , by introducing, for each
⋃
C oc-
curring in the knowledge base K , a new concept name UC together with the axiom
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UC ≡ ∃e−.C, and replacing all the occurrences of
⋃
C in K with UC . While the
proof of soundness in Proposition 1 extends to this case, alternative techniques would
be needed for proving completeness of the translation for the case with unary union, as
the proof of Proposition 3 exploits the finite model property ofALCΩ which we do not
expect to hold in this case. Adapting the encoding ofALCΩ into LCΩ is not immediate
and it might require a change in the encoding of the power-set concept as well. We leave
the study of this encoding for future investigation.
As we will see in the next section, a weakness of ALCΩ with respect to other ex-
tensions of description logics dealing with metamodeling, is that ALCΩ does not al-
low roles as instances of concepts. For instance, one could want to define a concept
Relatives including the roles hasParent , hasCusin, hasSibling, etc. and, in the for-
malisms admitting roles as elements of concepts, such as those in [25,23], one can in-
deed state that hasParent ∈ Relatives , hasCusin ∈ Relatives , hasSibling ∈ Relatives .
This is not possible in ALCΩ . The encoding of ALCΩ into LCΩ in Section 5.3, that
associates a concept Ui with each role Ri, might suggest a possible translation of mem-
bership axioms Ri ∈ C into LC
Ω as Ui ∈ C. Indeed, each element u ∈ Ui represents
a set of pairs (y, z) of domain elements such that z ∈ u ∈ y and, therefore, (y, z) ∈ Ri.
The feasibility of such an extension and the study of a possible translation of such mem-
bership relations into standard description logics are left for future work.
7 Related work
The power-set construct allows to capture in a very natural way the interactions between
concepts and metaconcepts, adding to the language of ALC the expressivity of meta-
modelling. The issue of metamodelling has been analysed by Motik [25], who proved
that metamodelling in ALC-Full is already undecidable due to the free mixing of logi-
cal and metalogical symbols. Two decidable semantics, a contextual pi semantics and a
Hilog ν-semantics, are introduced in [25] for a language extending SHOIQ with meta-
modelling, where concept names, role names and individual names are not disjoint. The
possibility of using the same name in different contexts is introduced in OWL 1.1 and
then in OWL 2 through punning7. As a difference, in this paper, we consider concept
names, role names and individual names to be disjoint, we allow concepts (and not only
concept names) to be instances of other concepts, by membership axioms, while we do
not allow role names as instances.
As in [25], DeGiacomo et al. [11] and Homola et al. [19] employ an Hilog-style
semantics to define Hi(SHIQ) and T H(SROIQ), respectively. While [25] and [11]
define untyped higher-order languages which, as ALCΩ , allow a concept to be an in-
stance of itself, [19] defines a typed higher-order extension of SROIQ allowing for
a hierarchy of concepts, where concept names of order t can only occur as instances
of concepts of order t + 1. In T H(SROIQ) [19] there is a strict separation between
concepts and roles (as in ALCΩ) and decidability is proved by a polynomial first-order
reduction into SROIQ, which generalizes the reduction in [15] to an arbitrary num-
ber of orders. The translation in [19] introduces axioms A′ ≡ ∃instanceOf .{cA′}, for
7 https://www.w3.org/2007/OWL/wiki/Punning
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each concept name A′, axioms which are quite similar to our axiom (1), that we need
for the conceptsC occurring in the knowledge base on the left hand side of membership
axioms.
In Hi(SHIQ) [11], complex concept and role expressions can occur as instances
of other concepts as in ALCΩ . A polynomial translation of Hi(SHIQ) into SHIQ is
defined and a study of the complexity of higher-order query answering is provided.
Kubincova et al. in [22] propose a Hylog-style semantics, dropping the ordering
requirement in [19] and allowing the instanceOf role, with a fixed interpretation, to
be used in axioms as any other role. The interpretation of role instanceOf does not
correspond exactly to the interpretation of e− in our translation, as we do not introduce
axiom (1) for all the concept names in NC , while we introduce it for all the concepts
occurring as instances in some membership axiom. In [23] Kubincova et al. define the
description logic HIR(SROIQ), an extension of SROIQ with an HiLog-style se-
mantics, which maintains basic separation between individuals, concepts, and roles, but
allows for meta concepts andmeta roles which are promiscuous (they can classify/relate
any entities). The logic features a fixedly interpreted instanceOf role, modeling the in-
stantiation relation.
Pan et al. in [28] and Motz et al. in [26] define extensions of OWL DL and of
SHIQ (respectively), based on semantics interpreting concepts as well-founded sets. In
particular, [26] adds to SHIQmeta-modelling axioms equating individuals to concepts,
without requiring that the instances of a concept need to stay in the same layer, and
develop a tableau algorithm as an extension of the one for SHIQ.
In [16] Gu introduces the language Hi(Horn-SROIQ), an extension of Horn-SROIQ
which allows classes and roles to be used as individuals based on the ν-semantics [25].
ν-satisfiability and conjunctive query answering are shown to be reducible to the corre-
sponding problems in Horn-SROIQ.
Badea in [3] first suggested a way of representing the power-set in a reifiedALCO∈,
using the universal restriction and two roles ∈ and ∋. [3] does not consider an higher-
order semantics, but interprets “quantified concept variables as ranging over (explicitly
given) reified individuals”, and develops a calculus for checking consistency in reified
ALCO∈. As a difference, here we show that a semantics quantifying over a transitive
set in the universe of an Ω-model can be mapped to standard DLs.
A set-theoretic approach in DLs has been adopted by Cantone et al. in [7] for deter-
mining the decidability of higher order conjunctive query answering in the description
logic DL4,×D (where concept and role variables may occur in queries), as well as for
developing a tableau based procedure for dealing with several well-known ABox rea-
soning tasks.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the similarities between Description Logics and Set
Theory can be exploited to introduce in DLs the new power-set construct and to allow
for (possibly circular) membership relationships among arbitrary concepts. We started
from the description logic ALCΩ—combining ALC with the set theory Ω
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interpretation domains are fragments of the domains of Ω-models.ALCΩ allows mem-
bership axioms among concepts as well as the power-set construct which, apart from [3],
has not been considered for description logics before. We show that an ALCΩ knowl-
edge base can be polynomially translated into an ALCOI knowledge base, providing,
besides decidability, an EXPTIME upper bound for satisfiability in ALCΩ . We also de-
velop a set-theoretic translation for the description logic ALCΩ into the set theory Ω
exploiting a technique, originally proposed in [10], for translating normal modal and
polymodal logics into Ω. The translation has been defined step by step, first defining
a set-theoretic translation for ALC with empty ABox, then for LCΩ , the fragment of
ALCΩ without role names and individual names and, finally, providing an encoding of
ALCΩ into LCΩ . The paper extends the preliminary results in [13] and [14], which do
not consider a set-theoretic encoding of role assertions and role membership axioms,
and exploit a slightly stronger semantics.
The set-theoretic translation, on the one hand, clarifies the nature of the power-set
concept (which indeed corresponds to the set-theoretic power-set, provided the valu-
ation of inclusions is restricted to the set corresponding to the domain ∆) and, on the
other hand, shows that the fragment of LCΩ without roles and individual names is as ex-
pressive asALCΩ . The correspondence among fragments of set theory and description
logics may open to the possibility of transferring proof methods or decidability results
across the two formalisms.
The set-theoretic translation of ALCΩ can be extended to constructs of more ex-
pressive DLs, and this approach suggests a way to incorporate the power-set construct
in more expressive DLs. As the proof techniques used in this paper exploit the finite
model property of ALCΩ , alternative techniques will be needed to deal with more ex-
pressive DLs. Other possible directions of future investigation are, as mentioned above,
the study of variants of ALCΩ semantics with well-foundedness and extensionality
(and, specifically, of their translation to DLs) and the treatment of roles as individuals,
which has not been considered as an option in ALCΩ .
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Appendix
Proposition 1 (Soundness of the translation) The translation of anALCΩ knowledge
baseK = (T ,A) into ALCOI is sound, that is, for any query F :
KT |=ALCOI F
T ⇒ K |=ALCΩ F.
Proof. By contraposition, assume K 6|=ALCΩ F and let I = 〈∆, ·
I〉 be a model of K
in ALCΩ that falsifies F .∆ is a transitive set living in a model of Ω with universe U .
We build an ALCOI interpretation I ′ = 〈∆′, ·I
′
〉, which is going to be a model of
KT falsifying F in ALCOI , by letting:
-∆′ = ∆;
- for all B ∈ NC , BI
′
= BI ;
- for all roles R ∈ NR, R
I′ = RI ;
- for all x, y ∈ ∆′, (x, y) ∈ eI
′
if and only if y ∈ x;
- for all (standard) individual name a ∈ NI , aI
′
= aI ∈ A ∩∆;
- for all eC ∈ NI , eI
′
C = C
I .
The interpretation I ′ is well defined. First, the interpretation BI
′
of a named concept
B is a subset of ∆′ as expected. In fact, for each x ∈ BI
′
, x ∈ BI ⊆ ∆ = ∆′. Also,
aI
′
= aI ∈ ∆ = ∆′. It is easy to see that the interpretation of constant eC , eI
′
C is in∆
′.
In fact, as the named individual eC has been added by the translation to the language of
KT , there must be some membership axiom C ∈ D (or (C,D) ∈ R) inK , for someD
(respectively, for someD and R). Considering the case that axiom C ∈ D is inK , as I
is a model ofK , I satisfies C ∈ D, so that CI ∈ DI must hold. However, as DI ⊆ ∆,
it must be CI ∈ ∆. Hence, by construction, eI
′
C = C
I ∈ ∆′ = ∆. In case (C,D) ∈ R,
it must hold that (CI , DI) ∈ RI . As RI ⊆ ∆ × ∆, then CI , DI ∈ ∆. In particular,
eI
′
C = C
I ∈ ∆′ = ∆.
We can prove by induction on the structural complexity of the concepts that, for all
x ∈ ∆′,
x ∈ (CT )I
′
if and only if x ∈ CI (8)
For the base case, the property above holds for C = ⊤ and C = ⊥, as⊤T = ⊤ and
⊥T = ⊥, and it also holds by construction for all concept names B ∈ NC .
For the inductive step, let C = C1⊓C2 and let x ∈ ((C1⊓C2)T )I
′
= (CT1 ⊓C
T
2 )
I′ ,
for some x ∈ ∆′. As I ′ is an ALCOI interpretation, x ∈ (CT1 )
I′ and x ∈ (CT2 )
I′ and
since by induction (8) holds for concepts C1 and C2, we have x ∈ CI1 and x ∈ C
I
2 .
Therefore, x ∈ (CI1 ∩ C
I
2 ) and, by definition of an ALC
Ω interpretation, x ∈ (C1 ⊓
C2)
I . It is easy to see that the vice-versa also holds, i.e., if x ∈ (C1 ⊓ C2)I then
x ∈ ((C1 ⊓C2)T )I
′
.
For the case C = Pow(D), let x ∈ ((Pow(D))T )I
′
= (∀e.DT )I
′
, for some x ∈ ∆′.
As I ′ is an ALCOI interpretation, for all y ∈ ∆′, if (x, y) ∈ eI
′
then y ∈ (DT )I
′
.
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By construction of I ′, (x, y) ∈ eI
′
if and only if y ∈ x and, by inductive hypothesis,
y ∈ (DT )I
′
if and only if y ∈ DI . Hence, for all y ∈ ∆ such that y ∈ x, y ∈ DI .
Therefore, x ∩ ∆ ⊆ DI . As x ∈ ∆′ = ∆, and ∆ is transitive, then x ∩ ∆ = x.
Therefore, x ⊆ DI , and x ∈ Pow(DI). As x ∈ ∆, x ∈ Pow (DI) ∩∆ = (Pow(D))I .
The vice-versa can be proved similarly.
Let us consider the case C = ∃R.D. Let x ∈ ((∃R.D)T )I
′
for some x ∈ ∆′.
As x ∈ (∃R.DT )I
′
and I ′ is an ALCOI interpretation, there is a y ∈ ∆′ such that
(x, y) ∈ RI
′
and y ∈ (DT )I
′
. By inductive hypothesis, y ∈ DI . Furthermore, by
construction of I ′, it must be that (x, y) ∈ RI and x, y ∈ ∆. Hence, x ∈ (∃R.D)I . The
vice-versa can be proved similarly as well as all the other cases for the concept C.
Using (8) we can now check that all axioms and assertions inKT are satisfied in I ′.
For an inclusion axiom CT ⊑ DT ∈ T T , the corresponding inclusion axiom C ⊑
D is in T . If x ∈ (CT )I
′
for some x ∈ ∆′, by (8) x ∈ CI and, by the inclusion
C ⊑ D ∈ T , x ∈ DI . Hence, again by (8), x ∈ (DT )I
′
.
Each assertion DT (a) ∈ AT , is obtained from the translation of the assertion
D(a) ∈ A. From the fact that D(a) is satisfied by I , i.e. aI ∈ DI , given property
(8), it follows that aI
′
= aI ∈ (DT )I
′
.
For each assertion DT (eC) ∈ AT obtained from the translation of a membership
axiom C ∈ D, from the fact that I is a model of K , we know that CI ∈ DI holds.
By construction, eI
′
C = C
I and we have seen that CI ∈ ∆ = ∆′. From CI ∈ DI , it
follows that eI
′
C ∈ D
I and, by property (8), eI
′
C ∈ (D
T )I
′
.
For each assertionR(eC , eD) ∈ AT obtained from the translation of a role member-
ship axiom (C,D) ∈ R, from the fact that I is a model ofK , we know that (CI , DI) ∈
RI andCI , DI ∈ ∆ = ∆′ hold.We want to show that (eI
′
C , e
I′
D) ∈ R
I′ . As, by construc-
tion, eI
′
C = C
I ∈ ∆ = ∆′ and eI
′
D = D
I ∈ ∆ = ∆′ from (CI , DI) ∈ RI , it follows
that (eI
′
C , e
I′
D) ∈ R
I . By the definition of role interpretation in I ′, (eI
′
C , e
I′
D) ∈ R
I′ .
For each assertion (¬∃e.⊤)(a), for a ∈ NI , it is easy to see that aI
′
6∈ (∃e.⊤)I
′
.
As aI
′
= aI ∈ A and an element of A in ∆ is interpreted as an empty set, there is no y
such that y ∈ aI . Hence, by definition of eI
′
in the model I ′, there is no y ∈ ∆′ such
that (aI
′
, y) ∈ eI
′
.
We still need to show that axiom CT ≡ ∃e−.{eC} is satisfied in I ′ for all the
concepts C occurring in K on the l.h.s. of membership axioms. Let x ∈ (CT )I
′
. By
property (8), x ∈ CI and, by construction, eI
′
C = C
I ∈ ∆. We want to show that
x ∈ (∃e−.{eC})I
′
, i.e. that (eI
′
C , x) ∈ e
I′ . By the definition of eI
′
in the ALCOI
interpretation I ′, (eI
′
C , x) ∈ e
I′ if and only if x ∈ eI
′
C . But x ∈ e
I′
C immediately follows
from the previous conclusions that x ∈ CI , as eI
′
C = C
I by construction. The vice-versa
can be proved similarly.
To conclude the proof, it can be easily shown that, for any query F , FT is satisfied
in I ′ if and only if F is satisfied in I . ✷
Proposition 3 (Completeness of the translation) The translation of an ALCΩ knowl-
edge baseK = (T ,A) into ALCOI is complete, that is, for any query F :
K |=ALCΩ F ⇒ K
T |=ALCOI F
T .
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Proof. We prove the completeness of the translation by contraposition. LetKT 6|=ALCOI
FT . Then there is a model I = 〈∆, ·I〉 of KT in ALCOI such that I falsifies F . We
show that we can build a model J = 〈Λ, ·J〉 of K in ALCΩ , where the domain Λ is a
transitive set in the universe HF1/2(A) consisting of all the hereditarily finite rational
hypersets built from atoms in A = {a0, a1, . . .}. As a matter of fact, the domain Λ is
to be extended possibly duplicating sets representing extensionally equal but pairwise
distinct sets/elements in∆.
We define Λ starting from the graph8 G = 〈∆, eI〉, whose nodes are the elements
of ∆ and whose arcs are the pairs (x, y) ∈ eI . Notice that, by Proposition 2, the graph
G can be assumed to be finite. Intuitively, an arc from x to y in G stands for the fact
that y ∈ x.
At this point, let ∆0 = {d1, . . . , dm} be the elements of ∆ which, in the model
I = 〈∆, ·I〉, are not in relation eI with any other element in∆ and are non equal to the
interpretation of any concept individual name eC (that is, dj ∈ ∆0 iff there is no y such
that (dj , y) ∈ eI and there is no concept C such that dj = eIC ). For any given d ∈ ∆
we define the following hypersetM(d):
M(d) =
{
ak if d = dk ∈ ∆0,{
M(d′) | (d, d′) ∈ eI
}
otherwise.
(9)
Observe that, for the concepts C occurring on the l.h.s. of membership axioms, as ax-
iom CT = ∃e−.{eC} is satisfied in the model I of KT , it holds that d′ ∈ (CT )I iff
(eIC , d
′) ∈ eI . Therefore, for d = eIC , M(d) = M(e
I
C) =
{
M(d′) | (eIC , d
′) ∈ eI
}
=
{
M(d′) | d′ ∈ (CT )I
}
.
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets inHF
1/2(A). This follows from
the fact that all finite systems of (finite) set-theoretic equations have a solution in
HF
1/2(A)9.
Our task now is to complete the definition of J = 〈Λ, ·J〉 in such a way to prove
that J is a model ofK in ALCΩ falsifying F . The definition is completed as follows:
- Λ = {M(d) | d ∈ ∆};
- for all B ∈ NC , BJ = {M(d) | d ∈ BI};
- for all roles R ∈ NR such that R 6= e, RJ = {(M(d),M(d′)) | (d, d′) ∈ RI};
- for all standard named individuals a ∈ NI such that a
I = dk, let a
J = M(dk) =
ak ∈ A.
By construction, Λ is transitive set in a modelM of Ω (in fact, for all M(d) ∈ Λ, if
M(d′) ∈ M(d), then (d′, d) ∈ eI and then d′ ∈ ∆; therefore, M(d′) ∈ Λ). We can
now prove, by induction on the structural complexity of concepts, that the following
holds, for all x ∈ ∆:
M(x) ∈ CJ if and only if x ∈ (CT )I . (10)
8 Strictly speaking the graph G introduced here is not really necessary: it is just mentioned to
single out the membership relation ∈ from eI more clearly.
9 More generally, when eI is a well-founded relation, M(·) is a set-theoretic “rendering” of
eI : the so-called Mostowski collapse of eI (see [21]). As a consequence of the duplication of
extensionally equal sets, not only we have the trivial property that, for d, d′ ∈ ∆, d = d′
implies M(d) = M(d′), but also the converse implication, i.e., M(d) = M(d′) implies
d = d′.
34 Laura Giordano and Alberto Policriti
The base case for concept names,⊤, and ⊥ is trivial, as ⊤T = ⊤, and ⊥T = ⊥.
For the caseC = B ∈ NC , by definition of J ,M(x) ∈ BJ iff x ∈ BI . AsBT = B,
M(x) ∈ BJ iff x ∈ (BT )I .
The inductive step in case C = C1 ⊓ C2 follows directly from the inductive hy-
pothesis. If M(x) ∈ (C1 ⊓ C2)J , then M(x) ∈ CJ1 and M(x) ∈ C
J
2 . By inductive
hypothesis, x ∈ (CT1 )
I and x ∈ (CT2 )
I . Hence, x ∈ ((C1 ⊓ C2)T )I . The vice-versa is
proved similarly.
The cases in which C = (∃R.D) or C = (∀R.D), are also straightforward. We
only consider the case C = (∃R.D). If M(x) ∈ (∃R.D)J , then there is a M(d) ∈ Λ
such that: (M(x),M(d)) ∈ RJ andM(d) ∈ DJ . By inductive hypothesis, d ∈ (DT )I
and, by definition of J , (x, d) ∈ RI . Hence, x ∈ ((∃R.D)T )I . The vice-versa is proved
similarly.
For the case C = Pow(D), by definition of translation, we have that:
(CT )I = ((Pow(D))T )I = (∀e.DT )I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∀y((x, y) ∈ eI → y ∈ (DT )I}
and CJ = (Pow(D))J = Pow (DJ) ∩ Λ.
Consider, for x ∈ ∆,M(x) ∈ Pow (DJ) ∩ Λ, which is as to say thatM(x) ⊆ DJ .
All the elements of M(x) are of the form M(y) for some y ∈ ∆, therefore we have
that:
∀M(y)(M(y) ∈M(x)→M(y) ∈ DJ ),
which, by definition ofM(·) and by inductive hypothesis, means that:
∀y((x, y) ∈ eI → y ∈ (DT )I),
which means x ∈ (∀e.DT )I = ((Pow(D))T )I and proves (10) in this case.
We can now use (10) to prove that axioms and assertions in K are satisfied in J .
The cases C ⊑ D and D(a), with C,D concepts of ALCΩ and a ∈ NI , follow
directly from (10), from the definition of M(·) and from the fact that CT ⊑ DT and
DT (a) (respectively) are satisfied in the model I ofKT .
For each membership axiom C ∈ D in K , we have to show that CJ ∈ DJ . As the
assertion DT (eC) is in K
T and is satisfied in I , we have eIC ∈ (D
T )I . Hence, from
(10), M(eIC) ∈ D
J . As we have seen above, M(eIC) =
{
M(d′) | d′ ∈ (CT )I
}
and,
again from (10),M(eIC) = C
J . Thus CJ ∈ DJ .
For each role membership axiom (C,D) ∈ R in K , we show that (CJ , DJ) ∈ RJ .
As the assertion R(eC , eD) is in K
T and is satisfied in I , we have (eIC , e
I
D) ∈ R
I .
Hence, from the definition of RJ , (M(eIC),M(e
I
D)) ∈ R
J . As we have seen above,
M(eIC) =
{
M(d′) | d′ ∈ (CT )I
}
and, from (10),M(eIC) = C
J . Similarly,M(eID) =
DJ . Thus (CJ , DJ) ∈ RJ . ✷
Proposition 6 (Soundness and Completeness of the translation of LCΩ)
For all concepts C andD on the language of the knowledge baseK:
K |=LCΩ C ⊑ D if and only if
Ω |= ∀x(Trans(x) → ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBox T → C
S ∩ x ⊆ DS))
where Trans(x) stands for ∀y(y ∈ x→ y ⊆ x), that is, x ⊆ Pow(x).
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Proof. (⇒) For the completeness, we proceed by contraposition. Suppose there is a
modelM of Ω, with universe U over A, which falsifies the formula:
∀x(Trans(x)→ ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBox T → CS ∩ x ⊆ DS))
Then there must be some u ∈ U , such that Trans(x) [u/x] is satisfied in M, while
(∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBox T → CS ∩ x ⊆ DS)))[u/x] is falsified inM.
Hence, there must be v1, . . . , vn in U , such that (
∧
ABoxA∧
∧
TBox T )[u/x, v/x]
is satisfied inM, while (CS∩x ⊆ DS)[u/x, v/x] is falsified inM. Let β = [u/x, v/x].
We define an LCΩ interpretation I = (∆, ·I), as follows:
-∆ = u;
- AIi = vi ∩ u, for all i = 1, . . . , n such that Ai occurs in K; A
I = ∅ for all other
A ∈ NC .
I is well-defined. By construction,∆ is a transitive set living in the universe U of theΩ
modelM, and AIi ⊆ ∆.
We can prove by structural induction that, for all the concepts C built from the
concept names inK , for the variable substitution β = [u/x, v/x], and for all w ∈ ∆:
w ∈ CI if and only if w ∈ (CS)Mβ (11)
The proof is by induction on the structure of the concept C. We consider the two inter-
esting cases of named concepts and the power-set concept. Note that, CI = {w | w ∈
∆ and w ∈ (CS)Mβ }.
Let C = Ai, for some Ai ∈ NC occurring inK .
w ∈ AIi iff w ∈ vi ∩ u, with vi = (xi)
M
β (by definition of A
I
i )
iff w ∈ (xi)Mβ (as w ∈ u = ∆)
iff w ∈ (ASi )
M
β (by the translation for named concepts)
Let C = Pow(D). By inductive hypothesis:DI = (DS)Mβ
w ∈ Pow(D)I iff w ∈ Pow(DI) ∩∆, by the semantics of LCΩ
iff w ⊆ DI and w ⊆ ∆ (by transitivity of∆)
iff w ⊆ (DS)Mβ and w ⊆ ∆ (by inductive hypothesis)
iff w ⊆ (DS)Mβ (by transitivity of∆, as w ∈ ∆)
iff w ∈ (Pow(DS))Mβ
iff w ∈ ((Pow(D))S)Mβ
The equivalence (11) can be used to prove that theALCΩ interpretation I is a model
of K , i.e. it satisfies all axiom inclusions and membership inclusions in K , and that I
falsifies the inclusion C ⊑ D. From this, it follows that, K 6|=ALCΩ C ⊑ D. We prove
that I is a model ofK .
For inclusion axioms, let C ⊑ D in K , we show that, for all w ∈ ∆, if w ∈ CI
then w ∈ DI . The inclusion CS ∩ x ⊆ DS is in TBoxA. We know that (
∧
TBoxA)
M
β
is satisfied in M. Hence, (CS)Mβ ∩ u ⊆ (D
S)Mβ holds in M. Suppose that w ∈ C
I .
From (11), w ∈ (CS)Mβ . As w ∈ ∆ = u, w ∈ (C
S)Mβ ∩ u. Therefore, w ∈ (D
S)Mβ .
Again from (11), w ∈ DI .
For membership axioms, let C ∈ D in K . We want to show that CI ∈ DI . We
know that CS ∈ DS ∩x is inABoxA and that (
∧
ABoxA)
M
β is satisfied inM. Hence,
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(CS)Mβ ∈ (D
S)Mβ ∩ u holds in M. Thus (C
S)Mβ ∈ (D
S)Mβ and (C
S)Mβ ∈ u. As
(CS)Mβ ∈ ∆, by (11), we get (C
S)Mβ ∈ D
I . To show that (CS)Mβ = C
I , from which
CI ∈ DI follows, observe that: (CS)Mβ ∈ ∆ and by transitivity of ∆, (C
S)Mβ ⊆ u.
From (11), CI = (CS)Mβ ∩ u, and thus C
I = (CS)Mβ .
(⇐) For the soundness of the translation, we proceed, again, by contraposition. Let
I = (∆, ·I) be LCΩ model of K , falsifying the inclusion C ⊑ D. By construction,∆
is a transitive set living in the universe U of an Ω modelM.
We show thatM falsifies the formula:
∀x(Trans(x) → ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn(
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBox T → C
S ∩ x ⊆ DS)) (12)
Let β be the variable substitution β = [u/x, v/x], where: u = ∆ and vj = A
I
j , for all
j = 1, . . . , n.
We can prove that, for all the concepts C built from the concept names in K , and
for all d ∈ ∆:
d ∈ CI if and only if d ∈ (CS)Mβ (13)
The proof is by induction on the structure of the concept C. Let d ∈ ∆. We consider
the two cases of named concepts and the power-set concept.
Let C = Ai, for some Ai ∈ NC occurring inK .
d ∈ AIi iff d ∈ vi, by definition of vi
iff d ∈ (xi)
M
β
iff d ∈ (ASi )
M
β (by the translation for named concepts).
Let C = Pow(D).
d ∈ Pow(D)I iff d ∈ Pow(DI ) ∩∆, by the semantics of LCΩ
iff d ∈ Pow(DI ), as d ∈ ∆
iff d ⊆ DI and d ⊆ ∆, by transitivity of∆
iff d ⊆ (DS)Mβ and d ⊆ ∆, by inductive hypothesis
iff d ∈ (Pow(DS))Mβ , by transitivity of∆, as d ∈ ∆
iff d ∈ ((Pow(D))S)Mβ , by the translation of the power-set.
Property (13) can be used to prove that the formula (12) is falsified in the model M
of Ω. It is enough to prove that: (
∧
ABoxA ∧
∧
TBoxT )β is satisfied inM and that
(CS ∩ x ⊆ DS)β is falsified inM.
To prove that (
∧
TBox T )β holds in M, let the inclusion CS ∩ x ⊆ DS be in
TBox T . Then,C ⊑ D is inK , and is satisfied in I . To show that, (CS)Mβ ∩u ⊆ (D
S)Mβ
holds inM, let d ∈ (CS)Mβ ∩ u. By (13), d ∈ C
I . Then, d ∈ DI and, again by (13),
d ∈ (DS)Mβ .
To prove that (
∧
ABoxA)β holds in M, let the inclusion CS ∈ DS ∩ x be in
ABoxA. Then,C ∈ D is inK , and is satisfied in I , i.e.,C
I ∈ DI . AsDI ⊆ ∆,CI ∈ ∆.
Let d = CI . By (13), d ∈ (DS)Mβ and, as u = ∆, d ∈ (D
S)Mβ ∩ u = (D
S ∩ x)Mβ .
Again by (13), (CS)Mβ = C
I . Thus, (CS)Mβ ∈ (D
S ∩ x)Mβ .
In a similar way we can show that the inclusion (CS ∩ x ⊆ DS)β is falsified inM.
Indeed, C ⊑ D is falsified in I , i.e., for some d ∈ ∆, d ∈ CI and d 6∈ DI . Clearly,
d ∈ u and, by (13), d ∈ (CS)Mβ . Hence, d ∈ (C
S ∩ x)Mβ . As d 6∈ D
I , d 6∈ (DS)Mβ . ✷
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Proposition 7 (Soundness and Completeness of the encoding of ALCΩ in LCΩ)
K |=ALCΩ F if and only ifK
E |=LCΩ F
E
Proof. (⇐) The soundness is proved by contraposition. Assume that K 6|=ALCΩ F ,
then, there is a model I = (∆, ·I) ofK such that F is falsified in I .
For the finite model property of ALCΩ , we can assume without loss of generality
that the model I is finite. To build from I a finite LCΩ model J = (∆′, ·J) of KE
which falsifies FE , we define a graph G = (N,E) where: N = ∆ ∪ D1 ∪ . . . ∪ Dk
andDi = {uis,t | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ (s, t) ∈ R
I
i }. E is defined as follows:
E =
⋃k
i=1{(s, u
i
s,t), (u
i
s,t, t) | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ (s, t) ∈ R
I
i } ∪ {(s, t) | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ t ∈ s}
We define an injection pi from the leaves of N , i.e. nodes without any successor, to A
and, for any given d ∈ N , we define the following hypersetM(d):
M(d) =
{
pi(d) if d is a leaf of N,
{M(d′) | (d, d′) ∈ E} otherwise.
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets in HF1/2(A). This follows from the
fact that all finite systems of (finite) set-theoretic equations have a solution in HF1/2(A).
Let Λ = {M(d) | d ∈ N}, possibly extended by duplicating M(d)’s to represent
extensionally-equal (bisimilar) sets corresponding to pairwise distinct elements in N .
As a consequence, as in previous cases, for d, d′ ∈ N , d = d′ if and only if M(d) =
M(d′), i.e., there are distinct sets in Λ for pairwise distinct elements of N .
Observe that, by definition of Λ, if (s, t) ∈ RIi , for s, t ∈ ∆, then there is some
d ∈ Di, such thatM(d) ∈ M(s) andM(t) ∈ M(d) (and, in particular, d = uis,t); and
vice-versa.
Our task now is to complete the definition of J = 〈∆′, ·J〉 in such a way to prove
that J is a model ofKE in LCΩ falsifying FE . The definition is completed as follows:
-∆′ = Λ;
- AJ = {M(d) | d ∈ AI} for all A ∈ NC , in the language of ALC
Ω;
- BJi =M(a
I
i ) = pi(a
I
i ), i = 1, . . . , r;
- UJi = {M(u
i
s,t) | s, t ∈ ∆ and (s, t) ∈ R
I
i };
- (F ih,j)
J = M(ui
aI
h
,aI
j
);
- (GiCh,Cj)
J = M(uis,t), for s = C
I
h and t = C
I
j .
By construction,∆′ is transitive set in a modelM ofΩ. Notice that BJi = M(a
I
i ) ∈ A,
and hence BJi has no elements. Notice also that, in the definition of (G
i
Ch,Cj
)J , s and
t are elements of ∆ and (s, t) ∈ RIi , so that u
i
s,t ∈ E. In fact, s = C
I
h and t = C
I
j and
Ri(Ch, Cj) is inA. Therefore, as I satisfies the ABoxA, (CIh, C
I
j ) ∈ R
I
i ⊆ ∆×∆, and
CIh, C
I
j ∈ ∆. In the following, we letM(Di) = {M(u
i
s,t) | s, t ∈ ∆ and (s, t) ∈ R
I
i }.
It can be shown that, for all d ∈ ∆, for all concepts C inK (or F ),
d ∈ CI if and only ifM(d) ∈ (CE)J , (14)
We prove ( 14) by induction on the structural complexity of concepts. Let d ∈ ∆. We
consider the cases of named concepts and the power-set concept.
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Let C′ = Ai, for some Ai ∈ NC .
M(d) ∈ (AEi )
J iffM(d) ∈ AJi (by the encoding for named concepts, A
E
i = Ai)
iff d ∈ AIi (by definition of A
J
i )
Let C′ = Pow(C).
M(d) ∈ ((Pow(C))E)J iff
iffM(d) ∈ (Pow(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk ⊔ CE))J (by the encoding E)
iffM(d) ∈ Pow((U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk ⊔ CE)J) ∩∆′ (semantics of LC
Ω)
iffM(d) ⊆ (U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk ⊔CE)J andM(d) ∈ ∆′ 10
iffM(d) ⊆ UJ1 ∪ . . . ∪ U
J
k ∪ (C
E)J
iffM(d) ⊆M(D1) ∪ . . . ∪M(Dk) ∪ (CE)J
iff ∀M(d′) ∈M(d),M(d′) ∈M(Di) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, orM(d′) ∈ (CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, d′ = uist for some i and s, t ∈ ∆, orM(d
′) ∈ (CE)J
(definition ofDi)
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, if d′ 6= uist, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, thenM(d
′) ∈ (CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, if d′ ∈ ∆, thenM(d′) ∈ (CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, if d′ ∈ ∆, then d′ ∈ CI (by inductive hypothesis)
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, d′ ∈ CI (as d ∈ ∆ and∆ is transitive, d′ ∈ ∆)
iff d ⊆ CI
iff d ∈ Pow(CI)
iff d ∈ Pow(CI) ∩∆ (as d ∈ ∆)
iff d ∈ (Pow(C))I (semantics of ALCΩ)
Let C′ = ∀Ri.C
M(d) ∈ ((∀Ri.C)
E)J iff
iffM(d) ∈ (Pow(¬Ui ⊔ Pow(CE)))J (by the encoding E)
iffM(d) ∈ Pow((¬Ui ⊔ Pow(CE))J ) ∩∆′ (semantics of LC
Ω)
iffM(d) ⊆ (¬Ui ⊔ Pow(CE))J andM(d) ∈ ∆′
iffM(d) ⊆ (¬Ui)J ∪ (Pow(CE))J (M(d) ∈ ∆′ is omitted as it holds from
d ∈ ∆)
iffM(d) ⊆ (∆′\UJi ) ∪ (Pow(C
E))J
iffM(d) ⊆ (∆′\M(Di)) ∪ (Pow(CE))J
iff ∀M(d′) ∈M(d),M(d′) 6∈M(Di) orM(d
′) ∈ Pow((CE)J ) ∩∆′
iff ∀M(d′) ∈M(d), ifM(d′) ∈M(Di), thenM(d′) ⊆ (CE)J ∩∆′
iff ∀M(d′) ∈M(d), ifM(d′) ∈M(Di), thenM(d′) ⊆ (CE)J
(by transitivity of∆′,M(d′) ∈ ∆′)
iff ∀M(d′) ∈ M(d), if M(d′) ∈ M(Di), then ∀M(d′′) ∈ M(d′), M(d′′) ∈
(CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ N , ifM(d′) ∈M(d) andM(d′) = M(uis,t), for some u
i
s,t ∈ Di,
then ∀M(d′′) ∈M(d′),M(d′′) ∈ (CE)J
(by definition ofM(Di))
iff ∀d′ ∈ N , ifM(d′) = M(uis,t), for some u
i
s,t ∈ Di, and (d, d
′) ∈ E,
then ∀M(d′′) ∈M(d′),M(d′′) ∈ (CE)J
10 We omit conditionM(d) ∈ ∆′ in the subsequent equivalences, as it holds from the hypothesis
that d ∈ ∆
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(by propositional reasoning and the definition of hypersets in Λ from
graphG)
iff ∀d′ = uis,t ∈ Di if (d, u
i
s,t) ∈ E, then ∀M(d
′′) ∈M(d′),M(d′′) ∈ (CE)J
(as there are distinct sets in Λ for pairwise distinct elements of N )
iff ∀uis,t ∈ Di if (d, u
i
s,t) ∈ E, then ∀d
′′ ∈ N , such that (uis,t, d
′′) ∈ E,
M(d′′) ∈ (CE)J
iff ∀uid,t ∈ Di if (d, u
i
d,t) ∈ E, and (u
i
d,t, t) ∈ E, thenM(t) ∈ (C
E)J
(by definition of E, s = d and d′′ = t)
iff ∀uid,t ∈ Di if (d, u
i
d,t) ∈ E and (u
i
d,t, t) ∈ E, then t ∈ C
I (inductive
hypothesis)
iff ∀t ∈ ∆ if (d, t) ∈ RIi , then t ∈ C
I (definition of E)
iff d ∈ (∀Ri.C)I (semantics of ALC
Ω)
Equivalence (14) can be used to prove that J is a model of KE that falsifies FE , thus
showing thatKE 6|=LCΩ F
E .
Let us prove that J is a model ofKE . We consider the interesting cases.
ForCE⊓¬(U1⊔. . .⊔Uk) ⊑ DE inKE , the inclusion axiomC ⊑ D is inK , and is
satisfied in I , that is, for all d ∈ ∆, if d ∈ CI then d ∈ DI . ForM(d) ∈ ∆′, letM(d) ∈
(CE ⊓ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk))J . Then,M(d) ∈ (CE)J andM(d) 6∈ (U1)J ∪ . . . ∪ (Uk)J ,
i.e. M(d) 6∈ M(Dj), for all j = 1, . . . , k. Hence, d ∈ ∆. By (14), d ∈ CI , and then
d ∈ DI . Again by (14),M(d) ∈ (DE)J .
For the membership axioms, let CE ∈ DE be in KE . The membership axiom
C ∈ D in K and is satisfied in I , i.e. CI ∈ DI . As DI ⊆ ∆, CI ∈ ∆ and, by (14),
M(CI) ∈ (DE)J . Again by (14), M(CI) = {M(d) | d ∈ CI} = (CE)J , Hence,
(CE)J ∈ (DE)J .
For each assertion Ri(Ch, Cj) in K , we have to show that the membership axioms
GiCh,Cj ∈ C
E
h , C
E
j ∈ G
i
Ch,Cj
andGiCh,Cj ∈ Ui added toK
E by encodingRi(Ch, Cj)
are satisfied in J , that is: (GiCh,Cj)
J ∈ (CEh )
J , (CEj )
J ∈ (GiCh,Cj)
J and (GiCh,Cj )
J ∈
UJi . As assertionRi(Ch, Cj) is satisfied in I , that is (C
I
h, C
I
j ) ∈ R
I
i . By construction of
E there is uis,t ∈ Di ⊆ N such that s = C
I
h and t = C
I
j , with (s, u
i
s,t), (u
i
s,t, t) ∈ E. By
definition of the model J , (GiCh,Cj )
J = M(uis,t). Also,M(u
i
s,t) ∈M(s) andM(t) ∈
M(uis,t) hold in J . Replacing s and twith their definitions andM(u
i
s,t)with (G
i
Ch,Cj
)J
we get: (GiCh,Cj)
J ∈ M(CIh) and M(C
I
j ) ∈ (G
i
Ch,Cj
)J . Finally, by construction,
uis,t ∈ Di, and U
J
i = M(Di), thanM(u
i
s,t) ∈M(Di) = U
J
i . Therefore, (G
i
Ch,Cj
)J ∈
UJi .
It is easy to see that the axioms Ai ⊑ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk), Bi ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk),
CE ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk), and axiom ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk) ⊑ Pow(¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk) ⊔
Pow(¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk))) are all satisfied in J by construction.
In a similar way, we can prove that F is falsified in I , considering the different cases
for F , and given the hypothesis that FE is falsified by J .
(⇒) We sketch the proof of completeness. The proof is by contraposition. Assume
that KE 6|=LCΩ F
E , then, there is an LCΩ model J = (∆, ·J) of KE such that FE is
falsified in J .
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For the finite model property of LCΩ (which is a fragment of ALCΩ), we can as-
sume without loss of generality that the model J is finite. We build from J an ALCΩ
model I = (∆′, ·I) ofK which falsifies F , defining∆′ as a transitive set in the universe
HF
1/2(A) consisting of all the hereditarily finite rational hypersets built from atoms in
A = {a0, a1, . . .}.
We start from the graphG = (N,E), with nodesN = ∆\(UJ1 ∪ . . . ∪U
J
k ), whose
arcs are defined as follows: E = {(d1, d2) | d1, d2 ∈ N ∧ d2 ∈ d1}.
G is finite. Observe that, for each ai inK ,B
J
i ∈ N , by axiomBi ∈ ¬(U1⊔. . .⊔Uk).
Similarly, for each Ai in K , A
J
i ⊆ N , by axiom Ai ⊑ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk).
We define an injection pi from the leaves of N (i.e. nodes without any successor)
plus the elementsBI1 , . . . , B
I
r ∈ N to A. For any given d ∈ N , we define the following
hypersetM(d):
M(d) =
{
pi(d) if d is a leaf of N or d = BJj for some j ,
{M(d′) | (d, d′) ∈ E} otherwise.
(15)
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets in HF1/2(A). This follows from the
fact that all finite systems of (finite) set-theoretic equations have a solution in HF
1/2(A).
∆′ = {M(d) | d ∈ N}, possibly extended by duplicating M(d)’s to represent
extensionally-equal (bisimilar) sets corresponding to pairwise distinct elements in N .
We have to complete the definition of I = 〈∆′, ·I〉 in such a way to prove that I is a
model ofK in ALCΩ falsifying F . The definition is completed as follows:
- AI = {M(d) |M(d) ∈ ∆′ ∧ d ∈ AJ}, for all A ∈ NC ;
- RIi = {(M(d),M(d
′)) |M(d),M(d′) ∈ ∆′ ∧ ∃u ∈ UJi (u ∈ d ∧ d
′ ∈ u)},
for all roles Ri occurring inK; R
I
i = ∅ for all other roles R ∈ NR;
- aIi = M(B
J
i ) = pi(B
J
i ) for all named individuals ai occurring in K;
aI = M(BJ1 ) for all other a ∈ NI .
By construction,∆′ is a transitive set in a modelM ofΩ. AsAJ ⊆ ∆\(UJ1 ∪. . .∪U
J
k ),
AIi ⊆ ∆
′. To complete the proof it can be shown that, for allM(d) ∈ ∆′, and C in K
(or in F ):
M(d) ∈ CI if and only if d ∈ (CE)J (16)
which can be used to prove that J is a model ofK that falsifies F .
We prove ( 16) by induction on the structural complexity of concepts. LetM(d) ∈
∆′. We consider the cases of named concepts, the power-set concept and the universal
restriction.
Let C′ = Ai, for some Ai ∈ NC .
M(d) ∈ AIi iff d ∈ A
J
i (by definition of A
I
i )
iff d ∈ (AEi )
J (as AEi = Ai)
Let C′ = Pow(C).
d ∈ ((Pow(C))E)J iff
iff d ∈ (Pow(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk ⊔ CE))J (by the encoding E)
iff d ∈ Pow((U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk ⊔ CE)J ) ∩∆ (semantics of LC
Ω)
iff d ⊆ (U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk ⊔ CE)J
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iff d ⊆ UJ1 ∪ . . . ∪ U
J
k ∪ (C
E)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, d′ ∈ (UJ1 ∪ . . . ∪ U
J
k ) , or d
′ ∈ (CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, if d′ 6∈ (UJ1 ∪ . . . ∪ U
J
k ), then d
′ ∈ (CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ ∆, if (d, d′) ∈ E, then d′ ∈ (CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ ∆, if (d, d′) ∈ E, thenM(d′) ∈ CI (by inductive hypothesis)
iff ∀M(d′) ∈ ∆′, ifM(d′) ∈M(d), thenM(d′) ∈ CI
iffM(d) ⊆ CI
iffM(d) ∈ Pow(CI)
iffM(d) ∈ Pow(CI) ∩∆′ (asM(d) ∈ ∆′)
iffM(d) ∈ (Pow(C))I (semantics of ALCΩ)
Let C′ = ∀Ri.C
d ∈ ((∀Ri.C)E)J iff
iff d ∈ (Pow(¬Ui ⊔ Pow(CE)))J (by the encoding E)
iff d ∈ Pow((¬Ui ⊔ Pow(CE))J ) ∩∆ (semantics of LC
Ω)
iff d ⊆ (¬Ui ⊔ Pow(CE))J
iff d ⊆ (¬UJi ∪ (Pow(C
E))J
iff d ⊆ (∆\UJi ) ∪ (Pow(C
E))J
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, d′ 6∈ UJi or d
′ ∈ Pow((CE)J ) ∩∆
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, d′ 6∈ UJi or d
′ ∈ Pow((CE)J ) (by transitivity of∆, d′ ∈ ∆)
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, if d′ ∈ UJi , then d
′ ⊆ (CE)J
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, if d′ ∈ UJi , then ∀d
′′ ∈ d′, d′′ ∈ (CE)J
(and by Trans2(∆\(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)), d′′ ∈ N )
iff ∀d′ ∈ d, if d′ ∈ UJi , then ∀d
′′ ∈ d′,M(d′′) ∈ CI (by inductive hypothesis)
iff ∀d′, d′′ ∈ N , if d′ ∈ UJi and d
′ ∈ d and d′′ ∈ d′, thenM(d′′) ∈ CI
iff ∀M(d′′) ∈ ∆′, if (M(d),M(d′′)) ∈ RIi ,M(d
′′) ∈ CI (by definition of RIi )
iffM(d) ∈ (∀Ri.C)I
The equivalence (16) can be used to prove that I is a model of K that falsifies F ,
thus showing thatK 6|=ALCΩ F .
Let us prove that I is a model ofK .
For the inclusion axioms, let C ⊑ D be inK . Then CE ⊓ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . .⊔Uk) ⊑ DE
is in KE , and is satisfied in J , that is, for all d ∈ ∆, if d ∈ (CE)J and d 6∈ UJi (for
all j = 1, k), then d ∈ (DE)J . Let M(d) ∈ CI . By (16), d ∈ (CE)J and, as d ∈ N ,
d 6∈ UJi (for all j = 1, k). Hence, d ∈ (D
E)J . Again by (16),M(d) ∈ DI .
For the membership axioms, let C ∈ D in K . The membership axioms CE ∈ DE
and CE ∈ ¬(U1⊔ . . .⊔Uk) are inKE and are satisfied in J . i.e., (CE)J ∈ (DE)J and
(CE)J 6∈ (U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)J . Thus (CE)J ∈ N and, by (16),M((CE)J ) ∈ DI . Again
by (16), CI = {M(d) | d ∈ (CE)J} = M(CE)J ), thus CI ∈ DI .
For each assertion C(ai) in K , the membership axiom a
E
I ∈ C
E is in KE . There-
fore, (aEi )
J ∈ (CE)J . By definition of the encoding, BJi ∈ (C
E)J and BJi ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔
. . . ⊔ Uk)J . Thus, BJi ∈ N . By (16),M(B
J
i ) ∈ C
I . Hence, aIi ∈ C
I (by definition of
the interpretation of ai in I).
For each assertion Ri(ah, aj) in K , we have to show that (a
I
h, a
I
j ) ∈ R
I
i . The
membership axioms F ih,j ∈ Bh, Bj ∈ F
i
h,j and F
i
h,j ∈ Ui are in K
E , and are satisfied
in J . Thus, (F ih,j)
J ∈ BJh , B
J
j ∈ (F
i
h,j)
J and (F ih,j)
J ∈ UJi . Let d = (F
i
h,j)
J ∈ ∆.
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Given that d ∈ UJi , from d ∈ B
J
h and B
J
j ∈ d, by definition of R
I
i , and B
J
h and B
J
j
are in N (by axioms BJh ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)
J ) and BJj ∈ ¬(U1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Uk)
J ) ) we
have (M(BJh ),M(B
J
j )) ∈ R
I
i . By definition of I , a
I
i = M(B
J
i ) and a
I
j = M(B
J
j ),
therefore: (aIh, a
I
j )) ∈ R
I
i .
For each assertion Ri(Ch, Cj) in K , we have to show that (C
I
h, C
I
j ) ∈ R
I
i . The
membership axioms GiCh,Cj ∈ C
E
h , C
E
j ∈ G
i
Ch,Cj
and GiCh,Cj ∈ Ui are in K
E , and
are satisfied in J . Thus, (GiCh,Cj )
J ∈ (CEh )
J , (CEj )
J ∈ (GiCh,Cj )
J and (GiCh,Cj)
J ∈
UJi . Let d = (G
i
Ch,Cj
)J ∈ ∆. Given that d ∈ UJi , from d ∈ (C
E
h )
J and (CEj )
J ∈ d.
AsCEh ∈ ¬(U1⊔ . . .⊔Uk). andC
E
j ∈ ¬(U1⊔ . . .⊔Uk) are inK
E , (CEh )
J , (CEj )
J inN
and, by definition ofRIi , (M((C
E
h )
J ),M((CEj )
J)) ∈ RIi . By (16), C
I
h = {M(d) | d ∈
(CEh )
J} = M(CEh )
J , and similarly CIj = M(C
E
j )
J . Hence, (CIh, C
I
j )) ∈ R
I
i .
In a similar way, we can prove that F is falsified in I , considering the different cases
for F , and given the hypothesis that FE is falsified by J . ✷
